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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CUSTOMS
SERVICE ACTIONS
PETER

M. GERHART*

This article is based on a report prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United States in connection with its study of judicial review of
actions taken by the U.S. Customs Service. The recommendations herein
wer-e adopted in substantially identical form by the Administrative Conference at its September 19, 1977, plenary session. The article examines the
present availability and scope if review of administrative decisions of the
U.S. Customs Service. The author analyzes the overall operation if the
Customs Service, procedures for internal review of Customs ,decisions and
for assessment of penalties and other sanctions, and the distribution if
jurisdiction to review Customs decisions between the U.S. Customs Court
and the U.S. district courts. His conclusion iffers extensive recommendations for the reform if the existing system, addressing such -matters as
jurisdicti?n; standing, burden if proof, and assessment of penalties.

INTRODUCTION

This article analyzes the adequacy of judicial reVIew of U.S.
Customs Service actions. Its principal focus is on the role of the
U.S. Customs Court and the federal district courts in overseeing
and controlling Customs Service actions; its underlying theme is
the manner in which laws relating to imports are administered and ·
applied.

* Assistant Professor, Ohio State University College of Law; J.D. Columbia Law School
(1971).
.
Some of the information in this article was obtained from interviews with customs attorneys, importers and brokers; many persons made helpful comments on an earlier draft of
the report. Leonard Lehman, the Assistant Commissioner of Customs for Regulations and
Rulings, was especially helpful. I received valuable research assistance from Teresa Bulman,
a Georgetown Law Center student, who worked on the staff of the Administrative Conference in the summer of 1976, and from Stuart Goldberg, a third year student at Ohio State
University College of Law. A number of persons gave valuable advice concerning the study
and recommendations, notably David B. H. Martin, Research Director of the Administrative
Conference, William H. Allen, Chairman of the Conference's Committee on Judicial Review,
and Jeffrey S. Lubbers, a staff attorney at the Administrative Conference.
1101

LAW & POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS

The U.S. Customs Service (Customs) is organized within the
Treasury Department to administer and enforce a variety of statutes regulating U.S. imports and exports. Its tasks include: processing incoming travellers, vehicles, merchandise, and mail; collecting
import duties and taxes; ensuring that prohibited merchandise is
not brought into the country; preventing fraud; investigating alleged unfair import competition; and regulating trade and shipping in many other ways. In all these tasks, Customs makes decisions and exercises discretionary powers affecting many persons,
under circumstances in which disputed issues of fact, law, and
policy are likely to arise.
Two courts share responsibility for reviewing Customs action.
The Customs Court, a nine-judge constitutionaP tribunal located
in New York City, is the exclusive forum for review of many
administrative actions of Customs, but deals only with disputes
arising under trade laws. 2 Other Customs actions are subject to
review exclusively in federal district courts. 3
Because analysis of the role of judicial review requires an understanding of the administrative process subject to review, this article
begins with an overview of Customs Service operations. Recommendations concerning changes in the administrative procedures
of the Customs Service are, however, beyond the scope of this
article.

While this article focuses on recommendations concerning judicial review of Customs Service actions. there is no assumotion
implicit that improved judicial review would be a panacea for all
Customs' ills. Indeed, reforms in the administrative process at
Customs may be far more important to effective and fair administration of the law. The recommendations herein would open the
administrative process to important judicially-mandated reforms,
but in the final analysis judicial review must remain the ultimate,
and not the principal, source of control of administrative action.
Reforms in the process for judicial review are therefore only one
part of an effective reform of the administration of customs laws.
Rather than surveying all Customs procedures, this article will
.

1

1
The Customs Court is referred to as a "constitutional" tribunal because Congress has
designated the Customs Court as a court established under Article III of the Constitution. 28
u.s.c. § 251 (1970).
2
Decisions of the Customs Court are reviewed by the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, 28 U .S.C. § 1541 ( 1970), whose decisions are subject to review upon certiorari by the
Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C. § 1256 (1970).
3
Sec text accompanying notes 180-198 infra.
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focus on the procedures used in three representative areas: (1)
those used to assess and collect import duties and taxes 4 on commercial importations; (2) those used to insure that imported merchandise meets safety and other regulatory standards; and (3)
those used to assess and collect civil penalties, especially penalties
under section 592 of the Tariff Act of 1930. 5 These subjects are the
most important of the tasks assigned to Customs: they affect the
largest number of people, consume the greatest amount of resources, and embody the most significant fact-finding and regulatory functions. 6
OvERVIEw: THE NATURE oF THE CusToMs PROCESS

Although the Customs Service was the first agency established by
Congress/ customs administration is one of the least visible and
least understood government functions. Few Americans have had
any exposure to the customs process beyond, perhaps, a brief
contact at the passport gate. Moreover, there is little published
description of customs administration, congressional oversight has
been sporadic, and, until recently, 8 the field has been left virtually
untouched by scholars. On the whole, there are few who understand customs administration beyond those who are regularly involved in the process-Customs personnel, importers, and a relatively small number of customs brokers and lawyers specializing in
customs matters. The system has been, and, to a large extent, still
is, an insulated area, ingrown and relatively unaffected by developments in other fields.
Customs implements-and at times formulates~an important
part of the national public policy concerning international trade,
4

Taxes collected by Customs on behalf of the Internal Revenue Service include excise
taxes, 26 U.S.C. §§ 4061-4227 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) and tobacco taxes, 26 U.S.C. §§
5701-5763, 251 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See generally OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL, U.S.
CusToMs SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, LAws AND REGULATIONS ENFORCED OR AnMINISTERED BY THE UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SERVICE 26-J (Apr. 1975) . .
5 19 U.S.C. § 1592 (1970).
6
This Article does not consider judicial review of actions taken under the Antidumping
Act of 1921, 19 U .S.C. §§ 160-172 (Supp. V 1975) or the Countervailing Duty Act, 19 U .S.C.
§ 1303 (Supp. V 1975), both of which are topics of great current concern.
7
Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, I Stat. 29 (repealed 1890).
8
See E. RossmEs, U.S. CusTOMS, TARIFFS AND TRADE 71-193,405-420 (1977); R. STURM,
A MANUAL OF CusToMs LAw ( 1974). A study prepared for the Attorney General's Committee
on Administrative Procedure describes procedures used by the Customs Service but is
somewhat dated. See 2 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL's COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRocEDURE, .
U.S. DEP'T OF jUSTICE, Ms)NOGRAPH No. 27, ADMINISTRATION OF THE CUSTOMS LAWS (1940).
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our economic system, and public health and safety. By collecting
import duties and taxes, by insuring that imported goods comply
with regulatory standards, and by administering laws against "unfair" import competition, Customs has a direct impact on the price
and availability of imported merchandise, on the safety and quality
of imported products, and on the nature of import competition
faced by U.S. firms and workers.
Moreover, the importance of the policies Customs implements
has paralleled the rapid expansion of international trade over the
last two decades. Customs' workload has increased rapidly 9 in both
volume and significance as international trade has become a major
soilrce of competitive stimulus-and thus potential injury-to U.S.
businesses. As a result, the question of how Customs operates has
assumed an increasingly greater importance.
The Customs Service traditionally has not been viewed as a
regulatory or administrative agency, and, until recently, has been
virtually untouched by the developments in administrative procedure of the past 50 years. Indeed, many Customs procedures
descend from, or reflect, practices developed in the last century. Its
operations invariably lack the procedural formalities often observed by other regulatory agencies. Customs does not resolve
disputes through hearings on the record before an impartial decisionmaker, has no administrative law judges to take testimony
under oath, and does not allow formal rebuttal of evidence relied
upon in making decisions. 10 Instead, decisions may be reached
without any articulated rationale, often on the basis of informal
discussions between affected persons and Customs personnel, and
sometimes on the basis of information which is not revealed to
those adversely affected by the decision.
Some of the procedures Customs uses may be required by the
volume of work the Service performs. For example, Customs must
process every importation of merchandise, which in fiscal year
1976 amounted to more than 3 million individual import transac9
Customs Modernization Act and Section 592 of the Tariff Act of 1930: Hearings on H.R. 9220
Before the Subcomrn. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways nnd Means, 94th Con g., 2d Sess. 37-99
(1976) (testimony of David R. Macdonald)[hereinafter cited as Modernization Act Hearings].
Customs estimates that since 1950 entries of merchandise ha~e grown 336 percent, entries of
vehicles have grown 236 percent, and entries of persons have grown by 199 percent. Id. at

40.
10
The single exception arises in connection with the revocation or suspension of the
licenses of customs brokers, for which formal administrative hearings are provided. Sec note
17 infra.
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tions_II In order to make the administration of this and other
functions workable, informality and- simplicity. may be necessary,
and discretionary authority of Customs personnel may be unavoidable.
,
On the other hand, many of the procedures Customs uses today
derive from those established when customs duties were the prin~
cipal source of government revenue. 12 Procedures at 'that time
were structured to protect the government's ability to collect revenue, with maxi-mum emphasis on efficiency, simplicity, and collection, and minimum emphasis on procedural fairness or availability
of review.
Now Customs' revenue-raising function is only incidental;
its primary function is to implement statutes regulating international trade. Congress sets import duties and authorizes the President to negotiate changes in duties, not with a view toward the
revenue they will produce, but on the basis of the impact that such
duties are likely to have on domestic markets and industries. Likewise, when Customs keeps merchandise out of the country, ensures
that imports !lleet product standards, or interprets and applies
statutes governing competitive practices, it exercises a regulatory
rather than a revenue-raising function. Thus, the basic function of
Customs has shifted, and many of the administrative procedures
that once may have been justified to protect the collection of revenue are no longer appropriate for advancing the public interest
that Customs now represents.
Because the significance of Customs' role as a regulatory agency
has grown, there is increasing interest in how·it performs its functions. The Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on
Ways and Means has formed a special task force to provide oversight of Customs administration 13 and has held two sessions of
hearings concerning customs modernization and the reform of
11

U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PROLOGUE '76 30 (1976).
In fact, for many decaqes after th,e establishment of the federal government customs
revenue .constituted almost the entire source of federal income. Average annual customs
receipts amounted to approximately 92.3 percent of the average annual federal revenue
between 1800 and 1820, and· constituted over half of total U.S. revenue until the 1920's. See
generally W. FuTRELL, THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN CusTOMS juRISPRUDENCE 29-56 (1941).
Today, customs revenue constitutes less than 2 percent of all revenue collected. See U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF CoMMERCE·, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES, CoLONIAL TIMES TO 1970 1121 (bicentennial ed., pt. 2, 1975).
13
Subcomm. on Trade of the House Cornm. on Ways and Means, Trade Press Release
No.6 (Mar. 23, 1977).
12
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monetary penalty provisions. 14 A bill approved by Ways and Means
would modernize some of the laws relating- to imports. 15 In addition, the Customs Section of the Civil Division of the U.S. Department of Justice is studying the jurisdiction and powers of the
Customs Court over actions of the Customs Service and other
agencies.
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AT THE CUSTOMS SERVICE

Customs Organization
:Most of t.~e work performed by the Customs Service is earned
out by personnel at 3,000 stations within the 300 ports of entry
designated by Congress and the Secetary of the Treasury as locations through which imported merchandise may enter the country.16 Customs employees at larger ports like New York City often
have specialized responsibilities. Customs inspectors are responsible
for examining imported merchandise and the vehicles, vessels, and
planes used to transport that merchandise. Import specialists ascertain the duties due on particular types of merchandise; for example, an import specialist in consumer electronic products determines the duties due on all commercial importations of televisions,
radios, phonogr<;~.phs, and similar merchandise. In this way, import
specialists develop familiarity with regular importers, their merchandise, and how the merchandise should be treated under the
various laws and regulations enforced by the Service. Ports in a
particular geographic area are encompassed within a customs district under the supervision of a district director, who is generally
the first to review disputed decisions made by personnel at the
ports. There are forty-eight customs districts, each encompassed
within one of nine customs regions under the direction of a regional commissioner of Customs.
At the apex of the organizational pyramid is the Customs Service
14

See Modernization Act Hearings, supra note 9; Customs Procedural Refonn: Hearings on H_R.
8149 Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Con g., 1st Sess.
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Procedural Refonn Hearings].
15
H.R. 8149, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
16
Within each port there are usually numerous stations where Customs personnel process
people or goods. There are approximately 160 stations on the U.S.-Canadian border, some
manned by only one person. Temporary Customs stations also may be established ·to
process nonrecurring imports such as those arising from lumbering operations near the
border. See generally 19 C.F.R. § 101.1, 101.3, 101.5 (1977).
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headquarters in Washington, D.C., which is headed by the Commissioner of Customs and divided into seven operating offices,
each headed by an assistant commissioner. Substantive legal questions arising from Customs work are reviewed and generally decided by the Office of Regulations and Rulings, which also promulgates Customs Regulations and administrative rulings and makes
other substantive determinations. The Office of Operations oversees day-to-day operations at the ports by establishing inspection
and processing procedures and training personnel. The Office of
Investigations conducts investigations and gathers information
needed to assess duties and carry out Customs enforcement functions.· Two other offices, Administration and Internal Affairs,
handle hiring, budgeting, and accounting matters and internal
investigations and control. The Office of Enforcement Support was
established in 1974 to aid in the prevention of fraud and smuggling. It is responsible for developing new technology and systems
to. support Customs investigation and interdiction efforts. A
seventh office, the Office of the Chief Counsel, provides legal
advice to Customs organizations. It serves as liaison with the Customs Section of the qivil Division of the Department of Justice,
which litigates cases before the Customs Court, and with U.S.
attorneys, who ·litigate Customs cases before district courts.
Merchandise Processing

1. Overview

Processing of imported merchandise by Customs involves two
initial steps: examination and release of the merchandise, and
entry. If the·importer has ob~ained a special permit for immediate
delivery, merchandise is examined and released by Customs under
bond as soon as it is importedY Within 10 days after the mer17
Many importers hire a customhouse broker as their agent to clear merchandise through
the customs process. Because of the important role they play, brokers are themselves the
subject of regulatory controls administered by Customs: Customs determines the qualifications and responsibilities of brokers, administers examinations, issues licenses (and has
authority to revoke or suspend licenses), and determines what functions may be undertaken
by nonlicensed brokers or agents. See 19 U.S.C. § 1641 (1970); 19 C.F.R. § Ill (1977).
Revocation or suspension of a broker's license follows a formal hearing before the district
director of Customs under procedures consistent with § 554 (adjudications), § 557 (decisions), and § 558 (revocation of licenses) of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. §§
554, 557, 558. See 19 C.F.R. § 111.62-.74 (1976). The decision of the district director is
subject to review by the Secretary of the Treasury whose decision is reviewable by a court of
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chandise is released, the importer or his agent must complete the
requirements for entry-submission (and acceptance by Customs)
of required documents and payment of duties and import taxes
estimated to be due on the merchandise. If the importer has not
obtained a special permit for immediate delivery, the steps are
taken in reverse order: the entry procedures are completed and
then the merchandise is examined and released.
After these two steps have been completed, the import
specialist "liquidates" the entry by determining the amount of
duties and ta,xes actually due on the merchandise, 18 and either
sends the importer a bill for additional charges owed or remits any
overpayment. Thereafter, the importer has 90 days to protest the
liquidation by filing a written statement. H after informal administrative reconsideration, a protest is denied by Customs, the importer may file a summons in the Customs Court challenging the
decision.
2. Immediate Delivery Privileges

Over 80 percent of all import transactions are processed under
special permits for immediate delivery. 19 Such a permit allows the
importer to take delivery of the merchandise as soon as it is examined and released by Customs, before he tenders the entry documents and estimated duties to Customs. The importer must then
complete the entry procedures within l 0 days. 20 Such procedures
benefit the Customs Service, importers, and brokers, because they
allow the physical inspection of merchandise to proceed independent of the documentary inspection (entry). For Customs, this
reduces congestion on the docks and alleviates pressures to expedite review of entry documents; for importers and brokers, it
allows merchandise to be received quickly.
Special permits for immediate delivery, issued to irnporters and
1
h"-'Y c~Istrict
l'
.
d"1rectors, may cover a parUcLHar
. 1 s111p111ent
'.
bro.ozers
or a11
entire class of merchandise to be imported for up to one year. 21 The
standards for issuing them are imprecise. Permits may be issued:
'l_

appeals. !9 U.S.C. § !64!(b) (1970). See, e.g., Twigger v. Schultz, 484 F.2d 856 (3d Cir.
!973).
18 Liquidation is defined in the Customs regulations as the "flnal computation or ascertainment of the duties or drawback accruing on an entry." 19 C.F.R. § 159.1 ( 1977).
19
Immediate delivery privileges are authorized by 19 U.S.C. § !448(b) (1970) and administered under regulations in 19 C.F.R. § 142 (1977).
'" !9 C.F.R. § 142.11 (1977). If the merchandise is subject to a quota the time period
within which entry must be completed may be shorter. ld.
01
Jd. § !42.3.
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for perishable merchandise and any other merchandise
for which delivery can be permitted with safety to the
revenue, when immediate release of SlJch merchandise is
necessary to avoid unusual loss or inconvenience to the
importer or to the carrier bringing the merchandise to the
port, or more effectively to utilize Customs manpower or
to eliminate or reduce congestion. 22
Although this. regulation seems to. put the burden on 'the applicant
to show that the conditions for granting the permit exist, in practice permits are issued routinely unless the district director believes
that issuance would impair the safety of the revenue. 23 There are
no procedures for challenging a refusal to issue a permit or for
review of such a decision.
.
Special permits may be discontinued or suspended by a district
director. Discontinuance may result if an importer "has repeatedly
failed to make timely entry without sufficient justification" or has
"not taken prompt action to settle a claim foL liquidated damages"
imposed for failing to make timely entry. 24 No procedures govern
the discontinuance of special permits. Suspension may result if the
importer "is substantially or habitually delinquent [in paying] Customs bills." 25 Suspension is governed by the following procedures:
the importer is given notice by a customs region that he is "substantially and .habitually delinquent," and that his permit has been
suspended in that region. Thereafter, if the importer pays all bills
on which he is delinquent, the suspension is lifted; if he does not,
his immediate delivery privileges are suspended in every other
customs region. There are no procedures by which a suspension or
22

ld. § 142.1.

23

The regulations are imprecise because Congress has never sanctioned .. the use of
immediate delivery privileges on a wide scale. When the statute authorizing immediate
delivery was passed it was th~ practice first to review and accept the entry docufuents and
estimated duties, and then to inspect the merchandise. Permits for immediate delivery were
to be "special" for "perishable articles and other articles, the immediate delivery of which is
necessary." 19 U.S.C. § 1448(b) (1970). Since importation has increased so greatly, these
permits are now the rule rather than the exception.
24
19 C.F.R. § 142.7(a) (1977). If the importer or broker does not make timely entry he
has breached one of the provisions of the bond covering the importation, and Customs may
assert a claim for the liquidated damages specified in the bond. The "action to settle a claim"
referred to in the regulation is either payment of the claim or a petition seeking relief from
the claim. See text accompanying note 109 infra. Such action is considered "prompt" if it is
taken within the time specified in the claim.
25
19 C.F.R. § 142.7(b) (1977). There is no regulation defining the term "substantially or
habitually delinquent."
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discontinuance may be appealed or otherwise reviewed within the
Customs Service.
The standards under which permits can be discontinued or suspended are imprecise. Because they are applied at the district or
region level, there is a danger of inconsistency. For example, there
is controversy concerning when entry is "time1y." 26 To be timely,
the entry procedures must be completed within 10 days after merchandise is released; completion requires acceptance of the entry
documentation by Customs. 27 If an importer submits entry documents on the first day after release of the merchandise but the
documents are returned to him by Customs for correction on the
ninth day, it may be impossible to resubmit them for acceptance by
the tenth day. Some district directors apparently treat this as untimely entry, while others consider entry to be timely as long as the
corrected documents are resubmitted within a reasonable period.
Issues such as these are currently being litigated in a district court
m 1llinois. 28

3. Examination and Release
Coniroi over imponed merchandise from the moment the merchandise arrives at a port is an important enforcement power
giving Customs the opportunity to examine the merchandise and
v;ithl1old its release if it does not comply vvitl1 regulatory standards.
Examination of merchandise yields information used in assessing
duties, reveals vvhether tl1e entry documents accurately describe tl1e
quantity and quality of merchandise, insures that each product is
properly marked to show the country of origin, and permits assessment of compliance with other regulatory standards. Because
of the volume of imports and inadequate staffing, however,
thorough inspection is often not possible. Only rarely do Customs
inspectors even count the items of merchandise to insure that the
correct quantity has been dedared. 29
In some cases, specialized examination may be required if infor26
The issue is important because untimely entry may lead to discontinuance of immediate
delivery privileges and to claims for liquidated damages under a bond. See note 22 supra.
27
See text accompanying notes 34-35 infra.
26
Gallagher and Ascher Co. v. Simon, No. 76-C-3499 (N.D. Ill., filed Oct. 12, 1976) (suit
to enjoin district director from suspending permit).
26
The process of examination and release normally takes very little time; it is generally
completed within a day or two after the merchandise arrives and is sometimes completed
within a matter of hours.
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mation is needed to determine duties or if the merchandise is subject to regulatory controls. For example, imported sugar is subject
to a "polariscopic test," flat glass must be weighed, and imported
petroleum ·must be tested to determine its API gravity at 60 de~
grees Fahrenheit. Customs has established procedures for determining such facts, often relying upon analysis by its own laboratories or by independent testing agencies licensed for this purpose. 30
More thorough and particularized in,spection may be necessary to
determine whether merchandise complies with other regulatory
statutes. Imported books and movies may be read or screened to
determine if they are "obscene;" 31 knives may be examined to
assure they are not prohibited "switchblade knives." 32 .
If the regulatory standards applicable to a particular product are
interpreted and applied by another agency, Customs will normally
coordinate its activities with the agency involved. Such inter-agency
action takes many forms and involves agencies as diverse as the
Department of Agriculture, the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare and the Consumer Product Safety Commission.
After Customs obtains the information it needs and determines
that merchandise should be allowed into the country, the shipment
is released to the importer. However, Customs retains control over
the merchandise because the importer's bond covering it guarantees that the goods will be redelivered to Customs upon demand. A
liquidated damage amount, up to the value of the bond, is recoverable by Customs if the merchandise is not so returned. Customs'
power to reacquire physical control over the merchandise-under
threat of liquidated penalties-is an important enforcement tool. 33
4. Entry
Through the entry procedure Customs ensures that required
documents are adequately and accurately completed, determines
whether the merchandise is admissible to the country, and collects
3
° For example, Customs has licensed "public gaugers" whose reports concerning the
properties of imported petroleum products are accepted by Customs as accurate. See 19
C.F.R. § 151.43 (1977). Procedures governing the examination of sugar are contained in 19
C.F.R. § 151.21-.31 (1977). Those pertaining to flat glass are contained in 19 C.F.R. §
15l.l 01 (1977).
31
See note 83 infra and accompanying text.
32
See'15 U.S.C. § 1241 (1970).
33
Procedures invoked when Customs demands the redelivery of merchandise or attempts
to collect liquidated penalties for failure to redeliver the merchandise upon demand are
discussed in text accompanying notes 108-10 infra.
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estimated duties and taxes on the merchandise. 3 ~ To complete entry,
the importer (or his agent) submits entry papers to the local customhouse for approval. 35 If the documents are found to be in
order, they are reviewed by the import specialist, who determines
whether the declaration of estimated duties and taxes is accurate.
He will refuse to accept the entry papers if the importer incorrectly
calculated estimated duties or taxes or if other information is erroneous or missing. For example, if the import specialist believes
that the classification the importer used to determine the rate of
duty is incorrect, he may require estimated duties to be recalculated before he accepts the entry papers. The import specialist does
not make a final decision concerning the amount of duties and
taxes due; his function is to screen the entry to ensure that, given
the information then available to him, the estimated duties and
taxes appear to be calculated correctly.
Importers usually do not contest the import specialist's calculation of estimated duties or taxes at this stage of the process, since
there are no established procedures for doing so. Therefore, if the
import specialist refuses to accept the entry papers, the importer
corrects and resubmits them. At a later date, the importer may
challenge such a determination and, if successful, receive a refund
of overpaid duties and taxes.
,., The text here describes "consumption entries," which allow the importer to receive the
merchandise as soon as it is inspected and released by Customs. Over 80 percent of all
entries are of this type. If the importer does not want the merchandise immediately, or, in
some instances, if the merchandise is to be remanufactured or exported, the importer may
make a "warehouse entry." In that case, the merchandise is inspected and stored in a bonded
warehouse, but estimated duties on the merchandise are not paid until· the merchandise is
withdrawn from the warehouse by the importer. See 19 C.F.R. § 144 (1977). For such
purposes, Customs has established regulations for licensing and bonding warehouses. Jd.
§ 19.1-.49.
Simplified entry procedures have been established for noncommercial importations. "Appraisement entry" is used for damaged merchandise, personal gifts, household effects, and
certain other classes of merchandise, and may be authorized by the Commissioner of
Customs in other instances. See id. § 143.11-.16. "Informal entries," which are made by
most returning tourists, are used for shipments valued at less than $250, for household or
personal effects or tools of trade entitled to free entry, for certain books imported by
libraries, and for certain other types of merchandise. See id. § 143.21-.28.
35
Entry papers include proof that the importer has the right to receive the goods (e.g., a
bill of lading); documents containing information needed to determine duties (a commercial
invoice, a copy of the Special Customs Invoice, packing lists); in some instances, proof that
the merchandise is admissible to the country (e.g., a certificate required by another federal
agency); and a document showing a declaration of duties and taxes (usually a Consumption
Entry). Under some circumstances, the import specialist or the district director may waive
the requirement that particular documents be submitted. Id. § 141.92.
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5. Customs Bonds
Customs bonds provide a means by which Customs, without
holding imported merchandise or resorting to a lengthy collection
process, can ensure that the interests it is mandated to protect are
protected. District directors approve bonds and determine the
amount in which they must be fiJed. 36
The three general bonds used most frequently with respect to
imported merchandise are: (1) the general term bond; (2) the immediate delivery and consumption entry bond (term); and (3) the
immediate delivery and consumption entry bond (single entry).
Most importers maintain either a general term or an immediate
delivery (term) bond. Customs brokers are not permitted to file a
general term bond, and generally maintain a term immediate delivery bond. Under an, immediate delivery and consumption entry
bond, (either term or single entry), 117 an importer or broker promises, among other things: to complete entry within 10 days after
release of the merchandise; to deposit estimated duties with the
entry; to redeliver the merchandise to Customs upon demand; to
pay duties which become due after Lhe merchandise is liquidated;
and to file additional documents requested by Customs. 38 A person
filing a general term bond agrees to the same conditions, and may
agree to several others concerning matters such as merchandise
36
The district directors are to approve bonds "if satisfied that the amowlt is sufficient, the
bond is in proper form and [a related form] has been properly completed." U.S. CusToMs
SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, CusTOMS MANUAL CM-139 to -140, CM-!40 (15th rev.
Oct. !976) [hereinafter cited as CusToMs MANUAL]. See also19 C.F.R. § 113.15 (1977).
The general term bond is generally equal to 10 percent of duties and taxes which the
importer paid in the immediately preceding year in that district or (if no such duties and
taxes were paid) I 0 percent of the amount of duties and taxes which the importer estimates
he will incur in the coming year (rounded to the nearest one hundred thousand dollars).
CusTOMS MANUAL, supra at CM-140. If current charges against the bond threaten to be
larger than the amount of the bond, the district director may require the importer, as a
condition of continued importation, to deposit supplementary duties, or file a larger bond, a
superseding bond, or a single entry bond covering each new importation. The amount of the
immediate delivery and consumption entry bond is determined on the basis of the amount
and frequency of the charges the district director believes will be incurred against the bond
and the speed with which those charges are likely to be discharged by liquidation and the
payment of duties. The single entry bond is equal to the value of the imported merchandise
(as determined at the time of entry) plus the estimated duties and taxes on the merchandise.
37
A term bond covers ·all importations within a single year. A single entry bond covers
only a particular entry.
38
Riders may be added to the bonds to cover special contingencies-for example, the
deferred payment of Internal Revenue Service taxes. See CusTOMS MANUAL, supra note 36, at
CM-140.
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entered temporarily (as for repairs), transportation of merchandise
in bond to another port for inspection, ;nd warehouse entries. 39
There are no writt~n procedures for challenges to, or review of,
decisions the district director makes with respect to bonds. If an
importer or broker believes that the amount of the bond or other
bond requirements are incorrect, his only remedy is to seek a
reversal of the decision from the regional director or Customs
headquarters; however, reversals rarely occur. 40
Ascertaining Duties and Taxes

Following entry and release of merchandise, Customs must
liquidate the entry by determining whether the importer paid the
correct duties and taxes at the time of entry. This article discusses
some of the substantive issues involved in ascertaining import
duties and taxes, and then describes the procedures leading to
liquidation and subsequent judicial reVIew.
1. Substantive Issues

The assessment of duties and taxes involves both factual and
legal issues. First, the imported merchandise is classified into one of
the more than 6,700 descriptive product categories in the Tariff
Schedules established by Congress. 41 The Tariff Schedules show
the rate of duty to be coilected~on products in each category, either
a specific rate (e.g., 10 cents a dozen), an ad valorem rate (e.g., 10
percent of "value"), or a combination of both. Classification decisions are of crucial significance for the importer, because they
establish the rate of duty to be paid. 42
Customs must also appraise the merchandise by determining the
value of the product under one of several standards established by
Congress. 43 Because those standards are extremely complicated,
'"' Jd .
.Jo Procedures for enforcing the provisions of a bond are discussed at text accompanying

notes 108~110, infra.
'" Description of the principles used to classify merchandise are set out in E. RossmEs,
U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TARIFFS AND TRADE ~l.~~J20 (1977);
Feller, An Introduction to Tariff Classification, 8 LAw & PoL'Y !NT'L Bus. 99! (1976), and R.
STURM, A MANUAL OF CusToMs LAw 145~399 (1974).
2
·'
See, e.g., Schmidt, Pritchard Sc Co. v. United States, 10 CusT. BuLL. 35, 36 (1976).
There the issue was whether certain wire rod coiling equipment should be classified as
"metal working machine tools" taxable at 15 percent ad valorem, or as "machines for working
metal, not otherwise provided for," taxable at l 0 percent ad valorem.
·•• The standards of valuation are contained in !9 U.S.C. §§ l401(a), 1402 (1970).
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appraisement determinations often involve complex statutory interpretation and intricate factual issues. 44
In addition to classification and appraisement, many aspects of
duty assessment raise complex questions. For example, imported
merchandise assembled in a foreign country from components
fabricated in the United States is entitled to an allowance for the
cost or value of the components, but only if the components were
exported in a state ready for assembly without further fabrication,
have not lost their physical identity, and have not been advanced in
value or improved in condition abroad except through assembly. 45
Customs personnel regularly make similarly difficult determinations.46

2. Procedures for Ascertaining Duties and Taxes
a. Liquidation
The import specialist uses informal procedures to determine
whether the estimated duties and taxes paid by the importer were
correctly computed. The scope of his investigation depends on the
product involved, the standards to be applied in determining value,
the prior experience he or other specialists have had with similar
products, and the extent to which he relies upon the information
supplied by the importer on the entry documents. The import
specialist's task, although complex, is facilitated in several ways.
The import specialist has "no obligation to compile a record or
verify information upon which he relies. Unless challenged, he
need not demonstrate the accuracy of his decisions to any impartial
decision-maker. Indeed, the import specialist need only "estimate"
the value of the merchandise "by all reasonable ways and means," 47
and even if ultimately challenged in the Customs Court, the decision is supported by a presumption that it is correct. 48
44
See generally, SENATE COMM. ON fiNANCE, 93o CONG., 1sT SESS., REPORT ON CUSTOMS
VALUATION 61-81 (Comm. Print 1973).
45
See Item 807.00 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States, 19 U.S.C. § 1202, sch. 8,
pt. 1 subpt. B (1970). Similarly, Item 806.30 provides for reduced valuation for articles of
metal manufactured in the United States, exported for further processing and then imported for still further processing. 19 U.S.C. § 1202, sch. 8, pt. 1, subpt. A (1970).
16
'
See, e.g., I 9 U .S.C. § I3 I 3 (I 970) (drawbacks of duty paid on re-exported materials), I 9
U .S.C. §§ 1506 and I 563 (I 970) (allowances for abandoned or damaged property), 19 U .S.C.
§ 1558 (1970) (refunds for exported or destroyed merchandise); 26 U.S.C. §§ 4061-4227,
5701-5763 (1970)(import taxes imposed under the Internal Revenue Code).
47
19 U.S.C. § 1500(a) (1970).
48
28 U .S.C. § 2635(a) (1970).
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The import specialist has a number of sources to guide his
treatment of relevant issues. Substantive decisions of Customs in
the form of notices, letters, and rulings are circulated to all ports
through a format known as the Customs Information Exchange.
Much of the information supplied to import specialists through the
Exchange is not published or otherwise disseminated to the public
unless it is voluntarily disclosed by an import specialist or released
under a Freedom of Information Act request. The import
specialist, either on his own or at the importer's request, may ask·
the Office of Regulations and Rulings to give advice on specific
substantive issues that arise. 49 National import specialists in New
York City act as Customs' repository and clearinghouse for data
pertaining to individual products or individual markets, including
records of how products have be:en dealt with at various ports, and
can give guidance on the basis of such data.
For some appraisements, especially those involving the determination of foreign value or cost of production, the import specialist
may gather additional information or verify that provided by the
importer. All information supplied by the importer is subject to
verification by Customs agents, who can obtain access to the records of the importer or his foreign supplier for such purposes. 50
In some instances, Customs will undertake a so-called "foreign
investigation," having Customs agents overseas obtain information
necessary for the ascertainment of duties. 51 Copies of reports resulting from such investigations are available to importers only
through discovery procedures incident to a Customs Court proceeding.52
49

19 C.F.R. § I77.ll (1977).
I 9 U .S.C. § 1509 (l 970). If an importer denies Customs information which is pertinent
to value or classification determinations, Customs can prohibit the r.elevant importation,
withhold delivery of merchandise, and, if the denial continues for a year, sell the withheld
merchandise at public auction. Id. § 1511 (1970). Customs also has authority. to require
importers to appear and testify under oath. !d. § 1509 (l 970). Interestingly, Customs has no
authority to compel those involved in importation to keep books and records relating to
importations, a defect which would be remedied by H.R. 8194 and H.R. 8367, 95th Cong.,
lst Sess. (I 977).
51
There are no published regulations governing the conduct of such investigations; they
are informal and the report of the agent making the investigation is the only form of record.
In most cases, importers who desire to do so are permitted to participate in investigations of
their foreign suppliers. However, if the importer is not informed by the supplier, he may
remain unaware of the investigation until the information gathered in the investigation is
used to appraise his merchandise.
52
Such reports are exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. See
I 9 C.F.R. § l 03 .I O(g) (l 977).
50
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If through such means the import specialist determines that the
importer's estimated duties and taxes were correct, the merchandise is liquidated "as entered," and 8ustoms procedures with respect to that importation generally are complete. Approximately 85
percent of all entries are liquidated in this manner. 5 3 If the import
specialist determines that the estimated duties and taxes were too
high, the merchandise is liquidated at the correct amount, and the
excess payment refunded to the importer. If the estimated duties
and taxes were too low, the merchandise is liquidated at the higher
amount, and the importer is billed for the difference. 54
As mentioned earlier, the standards to classify and value goods
are complex and extremely 'difficult to apply, so disputes do arise
between Customs and importers. Such disputes may be disposed of
informally, either before or after liquidation.
If the importer believes that the estimated duties he paid were
determined incorrectly, he might attempt to have disputed issues
resolved through informal administrative procedures prior to
liquidation. Typically, the importer would first speak to the import
specialist who made the disputed decision. If the import specialist
refused to change the decision, the issue might be raised with
the import specialist's immediate supervisor, the district director,
or the national import specialist in New York City. Alternatively,
the importer might request that the import specialist seek a ruling
from the Office of Regulations and Rulings in Washington under
the internal advice procedure, 55 in which case that office may issue
a letter ruling, settling the issue.
Should the importer decide to abandon the informal approach,
the goods would be liquidated and the importer given the opportunity to seek further administrative review by protesting the liquidation, and ultimately to seek review in the Customs Court.
Even if the importer raises no issues prior to the liquidation, the
import specialist may do so. He may ask the importer to correct
clerical errors or make noncontroversial changes in the entry
document or may issue a "notice of tentative liquidation" informing
53

Letter from Leonard Lehman, Assistant Commissioner of Customs for Regulations and
Rulings, to author (Aug. 26, 1976) (on file with the Administrative Conference of the United
States, Washington, D.C., and at office of Law and Policy in International Business).
54
The liquidation actually is approved by the district director of the port involved, but
rarely with more than pro forma review unless a disputed issue has already been brought to
his attention. Decisions of the district director are often m.ade by his staff under his
supervision.
,.
55 S~e 19 C.F.R. § I77.II(b) (2) (1977)
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the importer of a tentative decision to require additional duties and
giving the importer an opportunity to challenge the tentative determination. The importer then may discuss the matter with the
import specialist and seek an informal resolution through the import specialist's superiors. Again, final liquidation is geneni.lly postponed until these informal procedures have run their course. 56
The length of the liquidation process varies greatly. Many decisions are routine, based upon established precedent or information
supplied by the importer. Because of the volume of work there are
pressures to process entries quickly without raising controversy .57
However, there is no time period within which liquidation must be
completed. When disputes do arise, or when the determinations
made by Customs are complex, liquidation often does not occur
until long after the goods have been entered.
b. Protests
After liquidation is completed, the importer must pay any additional duties, but he then may seek review of contested issues by
filing a protest-a written statement setting forth arguments and
evidence to refute the determinations made in the liquidation. 58
The protest, which must be filed within 90 days of liquidation, 59 is
an important procedural step, since protests control access to the
Customs Court; no suit may be brought in the Customs Court until
after a protest has been filed and denied by Customs. 60
After receiving a protest, the import specialist reviews the issues
raised and submits a memorandum to the district director outlining
the facts and the basis of the liquidation. The district director, after
considering the import specialist's report and the protest, may
request further information and, although he is not required to do
56
Notice of final liquidation is given by posting the notice on a customhouse bulletin
board at the port of entry, not by mailing it to the importer. 19 C.F.R. § 159.9 ( 1977). If the
importer does not receive a refund of duties or a bill for additional duties, he may never
receive personal notice that liquidation has been completed.
57
The 1200 import specialists collectively liquidated over three million formal entries in
fiscal year 1975. U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, PROLOGUE '76 33 (1976).
58
Liquidations that have not beeen protested within the prescribed period are final,
although they may be corrected for clerical errors, mistakes of fact, or other inadvertance
not amounting to an error in the construttion of a law or, in certain circumstances,
reliquidated on account of fraud. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1520(c), 1521 (1970).
59
Id. § !514(b)(2) (1970).
60
Unless a request for accelerated disposition is filed, Customs has up to 2 years to review
a protest. 19 U.S.C. § 1515 (1970). When a request for accelerated disposition is filed, the
protest is deemed to be denied unless acted on within 30 days. 19 C.F.R. § 174.22 (1977).
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so, may give the importer an opportunity to discuss the issues
informally. If uncertain of how to resolve the issues, he may seek
advice either from the regional commissioner, the national import
specialist in New York City, or the Office of Regulations and
Rulings in Washington.
In some instances a protesting party may seek review of the
protest by higher authority than the district -director. This is possible: if the challenged decision is allegedly inconsistent with a ruling
of the Commissioner of Customs or with a decision in any district
concerning the same or substantially similar merchandise; if the
protest raises a question of law or fact not yet ruled on by the
Commissioner of Customs or his designee or by the courts; if the
protest, although subject to a prior ruling, raises -facts or legal
arguments not previously considered; or if the protesting party
had previously applied for, but had been denied, internal advice
under Customs internal advice procedures. 61
A protesting party seeking such review files an application for
further review with the district director. If the district director
determines that the claim is valid, he allows the protest (i.e., reverses the liquidation). If he believes the protest should be denied,
he forwards the protest and application to the regional commissioner for his district, who determines at what level further review
should take place. 62 If the protest involves a "strictly factual issue"
or if it "clearly" should be allowed under a specific ruling from
headquarters, the regional commissioner will decide the issue, 63 but
any other issue will be forwarded to the Office of Regulations and
Rulings for a decision. 64 If the protest is denied, the importer may
seek Customs Court review of the issues raised by the protest. 65
Regardless of who the ultimate decision-maker is, the procedures
used by Customs in ruling on protests are informal. Neither evi61

19 C.F.R. § 174.23 (1977).

62 U.S. CuSTOMS SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, fUNDAMENTALS OF DUTY ASSESSMENT

8-11 (2d rev. June 1973).
63 Jd.
64
ld. The regulations in 19 C.F.R. § 174.26 (1977) articulate the division of reviewing
. authority between the regional commissioner and Customs Headquarters by listing the issues
to be determined by Headquarters (the Office of Regulations and Rulings) and leaving other
decisions to the regional commissioner.
65 In fiscal year 1975, 57,012 protests were filed; 76 percent of these were denied by
Customs, of which less than I percent were challenged in the Customs Court. Letter from
Leonard Lehman, Assistant Commissioner of Customs for Regulations and Rulings, to
author (Aug. 26, 1976) (on file with the Administrative Conference of the United States,
Washington, D.C.).
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dence nor argument is preserved on a record, nor is there an
impartial decision-maker. Decisions may be based on i"1formation
which is not disclosed to the importer. Decisions need not be, and
generally are not, supported by a written explanation, although in
some cases the importer may receive a written or oral explanation.
More often, the importer receives only a notice that the protest is
granted or denied.
Customs has up to two years in which to act on the protest. An
importer may, however, apply for accelerated disposition of a pro•
1-..
_.]
r
test at any time more tuan 90 uays a1ter tne proteSL IS n1ea, In
which event the protest is deemed denied unless it is acted on
within 30 days. 66 If the protest is denied, the importer may seek
Customs Court review of the issues raised by the protest.
1

~

•.

("'1

1

•

c. Internal Audits

The decision of the import specialist concerning classification
and value generally is not reviewed unless the importer involved
questions it. Procedures do exist, however, to identify and correct
erroneous decisions that favor, and are thus not questioned by, the
importer. There a:re at least two ways-one formal and one
informal-in which erroneous decisions may be corrected.
Informally, incorrect determinations that favor an importer may
be detected if Customs recognizes that inconsistent determinations
concerning similar merchandise are being made at different ports.
This may OCClJ_r, for example, if tl1e natio11al in1port specialist in
New York City recognizes such inconsistent treatment in the course
of reviewing information concerning individual importations.
There is no guarantee that inconsistencies will be detected in this
way, and Customs apparently has no workable formal procedures
for systematically reviewing the treatment given to imports at the
various ports. The danger may exist that some importers will
"shop" between ports until they find one which gives their merchandise favorable treatment. The Customs Information Exchange67 is an attempt to obviate this possibility.

d. Review at Request

rf

U.S. Companies

A more formal mechanism for detecting and correcting incorrect
decisions is provided by infrequently used provisions permitting
66
67

19 C.F.R. § 174.22 (1977).
See generally text accompanying note 49 supra.
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U.S. companies, under certain circumstances, to challenge Customs
decisions concerning duties on merchandise imported by others. 68
Under these procedures a U.S. manufacturer, producer, or
wholesaler may request information from Customs concerning the
duty imposed on particular imports and may file a petition with
Customs alleging that the correct duty has not been assessed. However, the request for information and the petition may be "filed only
with respect to merchandise of the same class or kind as that dealt
in by the U.S. company. If the petitioner is dissatisfied with Customs' response to his petition, he may contest the decision by filing
an action in the Customs Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction
over such actions. 69 As with protests, Customs procedures for
handling such petitions are informal-the petitioner may be given
an opportunity to meet with th,€n:elevant decision-maker and may
present evidence, but he is not given a hearing on the record, an
articulated basis for the decision, or an opportunity to examine
confidential information relied upon in making the decision.
There is no similar mechanism by which importers can challenge
Customs decisions made with respect to the merchandise imported
by others, and importers have been denied the right to challenge
such action in a district court. 70
e. Administrative Rulings
One other aspect of Customs procedure is relevant to the duty
assessment process. Because of the many complex issues arising
under trade laws, and because importers, exporters, and others
often need to know how such issues will be resolved before they
engage in trade transactions, Customs provides interested persons
with a procedure for seeking an administrative ruling on an issue
arising under the laws administered by Customs. 71 Such a ruling
may be given if the issue is prospective (i.e., not already raised in
the course of Customs processing), is not hypothetical, and all facts
needed to make the ruling are supplied.
Once given, a ruling is binding on Customs with respect to the
68
19 U.S.C. § 1516 (1970). Regulations governing the procedures are contained in 19
.
C.F.R. § 175 (1977).
69
28 U .S.C. § 1582(b) (I 970).
7
° Kocher v. Fowler, 397 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,391 U.S. 920 (1968) (district
court has no jurisdiction to compel Customs to collect duties from competitor, even though
plaintiff has no recourse through the Customs Court).
71
19 C.F.R. § 177 (1977).
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transaction involved (provided thal the actual facts do not differ
from those on which the ruling was based) and is considered to be
authority governing similar transactions. Rulings thought to affect
a substantial volume of imports or transactions or to be otherwise
of general interest are pub-lished in the Customs Bidletin and, upon
publication, become established Customs practice. 72 However, if a
ruling changes prior practices and would result in increased duties
or import restrictions, or is thought to be of general interest to the
domestic industry, a Federal Register notice is published to give
interested persons an opportunity to comment on the :ruling. 73
There is no procedure for pre-enforcement judicial review of administrative rulings, but any ruling may be chalienged as applied to
particular import tr3..!-:tsactions.
Prohibited Imports

The Customs Service is the agency primarily responsible for
keeping prohibited merchandise out of the country and ensuring
that imported merchandise meets regulatory standards. 74 In
fulfilling this role, Customs enforces a large variety of statutes.
Some require Customs to decide whether imported merchandise
meets regulatory standards; under others, Customs merely enforces a determination made by personnel of another agency.
There is an important distinction bet\veen exclusion of merchandise pursuant to a customs law and exclusion of merchandise
pursuant to a law that is not a customs law. Exclusion action taken
pursuant to a customs law is generally reviewable only in the
Customs Court; exclusion action pursuant to a law that is not a
customs law is not reviewable in the Customs Court, but may be
reviewed in a district court. Unfortunately, no definition clearly
distinguishes between a customs law and other laws pursuant to
72
!d. § 177.1 O(a)-(b) ( 1977). An increase in a rate of duty or charge under an established
and uniform practice may not become effective without 30 days public notice. 19 U.S.C.
§ l315(d) (1970).
73
19 C.F.R. § 177.IO(c) (1977). Customs does not provide a formal hearing when considering administrative rulings, but interested persons who know of the ruling may be given an
opportunity to present their views .orally or in writing./d. § 177 .I, 177 .4. An importer may
also request a district director to furnish advice concerning valuation of merchandise to be
entered later. However, unlike administrative rulings, such advice is not binding on Customs
during actual appraisement of the merchandise. Jd. § 152.26.
71
Although it is an important part of Customs' work, Customs action which results in the
exclusion of merchandise from the United States is rarely su~jected to challenge in the
Customs Court. Less than I percent of all protests filed are to challenge such action.
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which merchandise is excluded. 75 An importer who seeks review of
an exclusion decision in the wrong court may find his case dismissed.76
1. Substantive Issues
a. Imports Prohibited Under Customs Law
An import quota is a control on the quantity of merchandise that
may be brought into the country during a specified period (usually
one year). Absolute quotas prohibit any importation of merchandise above the quota amount and generally apply to specific products from designated countries. Tariff rate quotas provide for an
increased rate of duty on imports after a specified amount of
covered merchandise has been imported.
Although quotas are usually established by other governmental
entities, 77 Customs may be required to determine the amount of
the quota 78 and must determine whether an import comes within a
particular quota category. 79 Customs attempts to ensure that quotas
are administered fairly: ideally, no importer should be given undue
preference, importers should be able to predict into which quota
category their product will fall, and information concerning the
amount of merchandise imported under each quota category
should be disseminated quickly enough to permit importers to
75
Generally, customs laws are those codified in Title 19 of the United States Code or
those applicable to imported but not to domestically produced merchandise. Other laws
under which merchandise is excluded are not customs laws. This general distinction is drawn
from the cases cited in notes 142-43 (cases in the Customs Court) and 183-86 (cases in the
district courts) infra. Although there is no authority on this point, seizures under the
obscenity statute, 19 U .S.C. § 1303 ( 1970), are probably best construed to be under a law that
is not a customs law; they are actions taken on the advice of U.S. attorneys under standards
applicable to both domestic and imported merchandise.
76
See, e.g., Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Comm. for the Implementation
of Textile Agreements, No. 76-1064 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 20, 1977), petition for rehearing denied,
(D.C. Cir. Sept. 2, 1977).
77 Quotas may be established by Congress, by an executive department (e.g., the Department of Agriculture, 7 U .S.C. §II 00 (1970)), or the President upon advice of an agency. See
19 U.S.C. § 225I(b) (Supp. V 1975). See generally E. RossiDEs, U.S. CusTOMS. SERVICE, U.S.
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TARIFFS AND TRADE 295-321 (1977).
78
For example, Customs must determine "the average aggregate apparent annual consumption" of certain fish to determine the applicable tariff rate quota. 42 Fed. Reg. 9739
(1977).
79
For example, quotas on certain textile articles specify various quantity limits for narrowly defined product categories, and Customs must determine in which category a particular import falls.
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estimate when the quotas will be filled. Most quotas are adrillnistered on a first come-first served basis; merchandise arriving at a
port is released by Customs until the quota is filled. Merchandise
arriving after the quota has been filled is generally held in a bonded
warehouse until the quota is reopened (usually during the next
year), or it may be exported.
Section 304 of the Tariff Act of 193080 requires all imported
merchandise to be marked in English to show its country of origin.
Products not marked in conformity with both the statute and regulations adopted by Customs are not permitted to eriter the country
and are subject to an additional 10 percent duty if not properly
marked at the time of liquidation. Issues arising under this statute
usually concern the size, location, and wording of the required
marking. 81 Customs laws also prohibit the importation of merchandise produced by "convict or/and forced labor," 82 and
"obscene" matter or matter "advocating or urging treason or insurrection ." 83

b. Imports Prohibited Under Laws That Are Not Customs Laws
Many statutes administered or enforced by Customs establish
safety or other regulatory standards for products distributed in the
United States, including the Lanham Trademark Act, the Consumer Product Safety Act, the Copyright Act, the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act, and the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
9 u.s.c. § 1304 (1970).
Customs regulations concerning both the wording of the required marking and exceptions to the marking requirements are contained in 19 C.F.R. §134.0-.55 ( 1977). See generally
R. STURM, A MANUAL OF CusTOMS LAw 421 (1974); Note, Tariff Law-No Option to Import
Without Marking, 12 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 596 (1973).
82
19 U.S.C. § 1307 (1970). Only one order prohibiting imports under this section is in
effect. 19 C.F.R. § 12.42(h) (1977). Preliminary determinations are made by the Commissioner of Customs after such investigation "as appears to be warranted," taking into account
representations offered by any interested parties, id. §l2.42(d), but without formal administrative hearings. The final decision to exclude merchandise is made by the Commissioner of
Customs with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, and can be protested. See text
accompanying notes 58-65 supra. If the protest is denied, appeal to the Customs Court is
possible. See text accompanying note .135 infra. See generally Armstrong, American Import
Controls and Morality in International Trade: An Analysis of Section307 of the Tariff Act of I 930, 8
N.Y.U. J. OF lNT'L L. & PoL. 19 (1975).
83
19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1970). Imported matter violating this prohibition is subject to seizure
under procedures prescribed by the Supreme Court. United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971) (forfeiture action must be initiated within 14 days of seizure and
completed within 60 days). See generally Comment, Government Seizures of Imported Obscene
Maller: Section 305 of the. Tariff Aci of I930 and Recent Supreme Court Obscenity Decisions, 13
COLUM. j. TRANSNAT'L L. 114 (1974).
80
81
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Act of 1966.84 Some such statutes absolutely forbid the importation
of specified merchandise. 85 Customs' primary task under these
statutes is to identify and interdict attempted entry of forbidden
products, which may give rise to questions concerning whether a
particular import falls within the prohibited class. 86
Statutes that set standards for, but do not. absolutely prohibit,
imported merchandise often require that other agencies determine
whether imports comply with the statute or applicable regulations.87 Customs merely enforces such decisions by denying entry to
noncomplying products. In such instances Customs action involves
little or no discretionary decision-making. Customs acts in accordance with the instructions it receives; if an importer is aggrieved
by the exclusion of merchandise under one of these statutes, his
complaint is usually with the agency interpreting and applying the
standard, not with Customs itself. Nonetheless,• Customs does have
an important administrative role in identifying products that are
subject to various regulatory standards and coordinating examination and testing procedures with the relevant federal agency. In
other instances, Customs seeks advice from other agencies when
making decisions. For example, in determining whether imported
material is either obscene or advocates or urges treason or insurrection within the meaning of the relevant statutes, Customs personnel generally rely upon the advice of U.S. attorneys.
Under still other regulatory statutes Customs action is predicated
to a greater degree on its own factual determinations or its interpretation and application of statutory standards. If a trademark
registered under the Lanham Trademark Act is also registered
with Customs, Customs may deny entry to imported merchandise

84
A complete list of all the statutes enforced by Customs, with relevant citations, is
contained in OFFICE OF THE CHIEF CouNSEL, U.S. CusToMs SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T oF THE
TREASURY, LAWS AND REGULATIONS ENFORCED OR ADMINISTERED BY THE UNITED STATES
CusTOMS SERVICE (Apr. 1975).
85
E.g., 22 U.S.C. § 1934 (1970) (munitions); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2077,2122,2131 (1970)(nuclear
material); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1241-1244 (1970) (switchblade knives).
86
See e.g., Precise Imports Corp. v. Kelly, 218 F. Supp. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), affd, 378
F.2d 1014 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 973 (1967)(whether imported knives fell within
prohibition on switchblade knives).
87
E.g., 7 U .S.C. § 1360(c) (Supp. V 1975) (decisions concerning pesticides imported
under Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act to be made by Environmental
Protection Agency), 21 U.S.C. § 381 (1970) (the Food and Drug Administration certifies
foreign establishments as approved sources for pharmaceuticals under the Food and Drug
Act and approves importations).
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·which "bears" 88 or "copies or simulates" 89 that trademark. Similarly, under the Copyright Act Customs may seize imports which in
its determination bear a false copyright notice or infringe a work
copyrighted in the United States. 90

2. PToceduTes joT Prohibiting Imports
The determination that merchandise should be excluded from
the country is generally made while the goods are held by Customs
for inspection. If so, the exclusion process may take one of two
courses. Customs may simply refuse to release the merchandise
until it is brought into compliance with the applicable regulation,
or, if it cannot be brought into compliance, order it to be exported.
Alternatively, if authorized by statute, Customs may seize the merchandise (even if the merchandise is still in Customs custody) and
proceed by means of administrative forfeiture proceedings, which
in turn may lead Customs to initiate an in rem forfeiture action in
a district court.
a. Refusal to Release Goods
Customs enforces most regulatory statutes applicable to imports
by refusing to release merchandise determined to be ineligible for
entry. For example, if Customs determines that textiles are subject
to a quota that is already filled, that televisions are not properly
marked to show the country of origin, or that a drug is imported
r
.·r
r
•
r
rrorn a noncerunea rorergn estaonsnment, Gusroms merery reruses
to release the goods. Such determinations are made by the personnel at each port as part of the entry and examination process, and
no hearing, evidentiary record, or reasoned opinion is provided. 91
An importer who seeks to have such a determination reversed
might first initiate informal discussions with the import specialist or
inspector, his superior at the port, or personnel in the Office of
'!

1

,.

1

.,..--.,

.

1

"' 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1970).
"" 15 U .S.C. § 1124 (1970). The Lanham Trademark Act, as amended, is codified at ! 5
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1072, 1091-1096, 1111-1121, 1123, 1127 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
9
° Congress revised the Copyright Act in 1976, Pub. L No. 91-553,90 Stat. 2541 (to be
codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810). As part of tl1e revision, Congress gave Cmtoms authority
(to be codified at 17 U .S.C. § 603) to adopt regulations requiring a court order before it can
take action against imports.
91
An importer may decide not to challenge the determination. The im-porter of textiles
may export the merchandise or store it in a bonded warehouse until the next quota period.
The importer of televisions may export them or mark them in accordance with Custom's
demands. The importer of drugs may attempt to have the foreign establishment certified or
may export or destroy the drugs under Customs supervision.
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Regulations and Rulings. In addition, if the decision not to release
the merchandise is made under a customs law, the importer has 90
days in which to file a protest. 92 Because such a protest involves the
exclusion of merchandise, Customs must respond to it within 30
days; if no response is given, or if the protest is denied, the
importer can file a summons in the Customs Court seeking review
of the issues raised in the protest. 93 Customs procedures for handling such a protest are similar in their informality to procedures
used for protests against liquidation decisions. 94
If the exclusion of merchandise is pursuant to a law other than a
customs law, the protest procedures are not available. An importer
may utilize internal advice procedures to have the exclusion considered by the Office of Regulations and Rulings, 95 but there are
no assurances that such procedures will provide prompt review .96
Importers faced with continued refusal by Customs to release merchandise may be granted review of that decision in a district
court. 97

b. Seizure and ForfeituTe
Some. of the statutes and regulations enforced by Customs require or authorize the. seizure and forfeiture of prohibited merchandise.98 Under such statutes, seizure is used even if the merchandise has not been released by Customs. Seizure procedures can

19 u.s.c. § 1514 (1970) ..
19 C.F.R. § 174.21 (1977).
94 See text accompanying notes 58-65 supra.
95 The procedures for obtaining internal advice are set forth in 19 C.F.R. §.177.11 (1977).
Customs recently published a ruling given under the internal advice procedure at the
request of a person whose merchandise had been refused entry as unlawful switchblade
knives. See II CusT. BuLL. 7 (1977).
96 Exclusion often results from a factual or legal determination made by an agency other
than Customs, in which event challenge through the administrative process may depend on
procedures established by the other agency. Interestingly, the Consumer Product Safety
Commission provides an importer with a hearing on the record before an impartial hearing
examiner before instructing Customs to prohibit goods from entering the country. See 15
U.S.C. § 2066 (Supp. V 1975). This formal procedure for resolving disputed issues contrasts
sharply with the more informal procedures used by Customs.
91 See cases cited in notes 183-86 infra.
9 8 Such statutes are of two types: those that authorize seizure because the merchandise is
not allowed in the country, and those that authorize seizure because the person importing the
merchandise has violated the law. The procedures described here are applicable to seizures
under both types of statutes. Merchandise smuggled into the country is also subject to
seizure and forfeiture.
92
93
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be illustrated by Customs enforcement of the Lanham Trademark
Act.gg

Before seizure, while the goods are held by Customs, the importer is given notice of the alleged violation and an opportunity
either to remedy the violation or to persuade Customs that no
violation has occurred. With respect to alleged trademark infringement, the importer receives notice that the goods will be detained
(i.e., denied entry) for 30 days, during which time the importer
may demonstrate that the imports are not infringing any trademark, obtain the trademark owner's consent to the importation, or
remove the allegedly offending mark. 100 If the importer does not
obtain release of the merchandise by one of these methods within
30 days, the importer is notified of his forfeiture liability, the
merchandise is seized, and forfeiture proceedings are instituted. 101
However, the importer is given an opportunity to petition Customs for relief from forfeiture under mitigation provisions.102
The mitigation procedure (formally kno~vn as a "petition for
relief from forfeiture") is initiated when the importer petitions
Customs to reverse or otherwise modify its decision. 103 In the case
of alleged trademark infringement, the application is reviewed by
personnel in the Office of Regulations and Rulings, who hold
informal discussions with interested parties-including the U.S.
trademark owner-before making a determination. In unusual or
significant cases, the Commissioner of Customs or the Secretary of
the Treasury may become involved in the administrative ruling.
If the importer does not file a mitigation petition, or if the issue
is not resolved through the mitigation procedures, the Service
moves to forfeit the goods. 104 Customs may proceed by summary
"" 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1072,1091-1096, 1lll-1121, 1123, ll27 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).lt
is unlawful to irnport Inerchandise which "bears" or "simulates or copies'' a tradeinark
registered under the Act on the Principal Register and with Customs.
100
19 C.F.R. § 133.22 (1977). The initial decision to detain merchandise is made by the
import specialist, who may seek advice from his immediate superiors or from the Office of
Regulations and Rulings in Washington, D.C. In many instances Customs is notified of the
suspected infringement by the U.S. owner of the trademark, and inspectors are made aware
of the possibility of importations of allegedly infringing merchandise.
101
19 C.F.R. § 133.22(c) (1977).
1112 The mitigation procedures are contained in 19 C.F.R. § 171.11-.13 (1977).
103 In cases of alleged trademark infringement there is slight opportunity for compromise, since the merchandise is not allowed in the country if Customs finds it to be infringing.
The mitigation procedures are most often used when Customs is seeking monetary penalties.
10 "' Some statutes authorize Customs to proceed against seized property in libel actions, in
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forfeiture when the merchandise is either of a type whose entry is
prohibited (as it would be if it allegedly infringed a U.S. trademark), or valued at less than $2,500. 105 It does so by giving the
importer notice of summary forfeiture. Only if the importer files a
claim for the goods is the case referred to a U.S. attorney for
condemnation proceedings in a district court, after vyhich the
goods a:re either released to the importer (if the importer prevails)
or destroyed (if Customs prevails).
If merchandise is valued at over $2,500 and is not of a type
whose entry is prohibited, the only way Customs can secure forfeiture of the merchandise following the mitigation procedures is to
refer the matter to u.s. attorney for the institution of condemnation proce~dings in a district court. 1 06 In such condemnation
proceedings, rules concerning the burden of proof facilitate the
government's proof of a violation of law: once the government
shows probable cause for instituting the forfeiture proceedigg, the
person claiming the property has the burden of proving tfiat the
alleged violation of law giving rise to the seizure did not occur. 1 07

a

c. Recovery

rf Merchandise

After Release

If Customs determines that merchandise should not be allowed
in the country, but the merchandise has already been released to
the importer, Customs has two options. If authorized by statute, it
may seize the merchandise, in which event the mitigation and
forfeiture procedures outlined above are followed. Such procedures are employed, for example, when Customs seizes merchandise alleged to be obscene.
If the merchandise is not subject to seizure, Customs may demand that the goods be delivered to it. The bond filed by the
importer guarantees redelivery of merchandise not already sold or
disposed of. If the goods are not redelivered upon demand, the
importer has breached the bond and Customs may recover from
the importer the liquidated damages specified in the bond. 108 Cuswhich event Customs refers the case to a U.S. attorney for court proceedings without
following the summary administrative procedures described in the text. 19 C.F.R. § 162.42
(I 977).
105
/d. § 162.46-.47.
106
/d. § 162.49. Merchandise may be seized even if it is not of a type which is prohibited
from entering the country, under statutes providing for seizure and forfeiture as a sanction
for failure to report or for false or fraudulent practices.
107
19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1970).
108
The procedures described here are also used by Customs to recover liquidated penal-
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toms proceeds by giving the importer notice of its claim for liquidated damages and a demand for payment, following which the
importer has the opportunity to file a petition for relief, setting
forth facts that justify a cancellation of the claim. 1 09 Such a petition
is subject to informal administrative review. The importer may
discuss the issues with Customs personnel, but there is no
provision for presentation of evidence or cross-examination at a
hearing, or for a decision on the record. Most often, the parties
reach a compromise and the importer pays a mitigated damage
amount. If no compromise is reached (or if the importer does not
file a petition for relief), the case can be referred to a U.S. attorney
for the institution of an action in a federal district court to recover
the liquidated damages stipulated in the bond. 110
Penalty Provisions

Because the Customs Service relies primarily on information
reported by importers, it must be assured that such information is
accurate and complete. To further that end, Congress has granted
Customs broad authoritv to imoose rnenalties on
those who either
fail to report or report in a false or fraudulent manner.
The most notable such authority is contained in 19 U .S.C. § 592
(hereinafter referred to as section 592), which prohibits fraudtuent
or false statements or practices with respect to imports, and, as a
penalty, authorizes Customs to seek forfeiture of either the imported goods or the value of the imported goods. Although there
are 40 other statutes which authorize Customs to assess fines or
penalties, 111 section 592 is the most often invoked and the most
controversial of the penalty provisions. 112
.;

-

---A

-

ties for noncompliance with the other conditions of a bond-for example, failure to complete entry procedures within stipulated time periods or deliver reguired documentation.
lOD 19 C.F.R. § 172.1 (1977).
110
1d. § ! 72.2.
111
A list of a!! such statutes is contained in P;·ocedural Reform Hearings, sujJra note 13, at
315 (statement of author) and 541 (statement of Customs Service). See, e.g., 19 U .S.C. § 1460
(1970) (failure to report arrival of a vessel in the United States from a contiguous country);
19 U.S.C. § 1584 (1970) (failure to provide accurate manifests); 19 U .S.C. § 1497 (1970)
(failure to properly declare articles ~pan entry).
112
Enforcement of Section 592 is an area of Customs activity that has received wide
publicity and attention. See Dickey, CllStoms: Fines, Forfeitures, Penalties and the Mitigation
Procedures--Sections 592 and 618 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 30 Bus. LAw. 299 (1975)[ hereinafter cited as Dickey I]; Dickey, SuroivaL1 from More Primitive Times: Customs Forfeitures in the
iVlodern Commercial Setting Und<>r Sections 592 and 618 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 7 LAw 8c PoL'Y
INT'L Bus. 691 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Dickey II]; Herzstein. The Need to Reform Section
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Substantively, section 592 prohibits a broad range of conduct,
making it unlawful to attempt to bring merchandise into the
United States by means of any "fraudulent or false" statement or
practice "without reasonable cause to believe the truth" of the
statement, whether or not the United States is deprived of duties'"
The statute also makes it unlawful to aid or procure such fals'e
statement or practice, and prohibits any willful act or omission by
which the United States may be deprived of duties. 113 Many section
592 cases result from false statements on entry documents, such as
understatements of the quantity of goods imported, misstatements
of the invoice price of goods, or the omission of information
required by Customs to determine the proper appraised value of
merchandise-for example, data concerning buying commissions
or "assists.'' 114 If an importer misstates the country of origin of
merchandise to avoid restrictions on trading with certain countries
or ships merchandise through a third country to avoid a quota, he
is subject to penalties under section 592 .n 5 Section 592 violations
are not limited, however, to statements or practices known to be
false by the person involved-even a negligent falsehood is prohibited by section 592 if it occurs without a "reasonable cause to
believe the truth" of the statement. 116
The penalty for violation of section 592 is fixed by statute and is
592 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 10 INT'L LAw. 285 (1976). See also Modernization Act Hearings,
supra note 9; Procedural Reform Hearings, supra note 14.
113
19 U.S.C. § 1592 (1970). Two criminal statutes also prohibit false import practices.
Using language similar to that in section 592, 18 U.S.C. § 542 (1970) provides for a fine of
not more than $5,000 and/or imprisonment for not more than 2 years for false or fraudulent
statements or practices. Suspected ·violations of this provision are referred to U.S. attorneys
by the Customs Special Agent investigating the alleged violations, after review and consultation with the Regional Counsel of Customs. See U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, CIRCULAR No. ENF-3-CC Uune 10, 1975). Under a second criminal statute, 18
U.S.C. § 545 (1970), it is unlawful to knowingly and wilfully smuggle or clandestinely
introduce merchandise into the United States or to make out any false or fraudulent
document with intenno defraud the United States. Violations are punishable by a fine of not
more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. See also id. § 543.
'" Assists include blueprints, molds, and dies given by the importer to the foreign
manufacturer in connection with the manufacture of merchandise for the importer. The
value of such assists must be considered in determining dutiable value and is. required to be
stated on the entry documents. Often, there is a legitimate dispute concerning which types of
services constitute dutiable assists.
'" U.S. Dep't of the Treasury News Release, Customs Frauds: Hunting Moths in a Dust Storm
(Oct. 26, 1975). See also Dickey I, supra note 112, at 303-05.
116
See, e.g., United States v. Wagner, 434 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. I 970) which interpreted and
modified an earlier case holding that intent to defraud was a required element of a section
592 violation. See also Kohner v. Wechsler, 477 F.2d 666, 673 n.I2 (2d Cir. 1973).
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exttemely high. Regardless of the culpability of the violator or the
revenue loss or other injury to the United States, the penalty is
fixed as forfeiture of the imported goods or their value. 117 As a
result, Customs often must assess extreme penalties (which may
later be mitigated) for relatively insignificant violations.U 8 Although Customs is authorized by section 592 to seize merchandise
and seek its forfeiture as a sanction, it rarely does this. 119 Customs
never seizes merchandise if, as is often the case, it is in the hands
of an innocent purchaser120 when the violation is discovered. Customs regulations were recently amended to provide that merchandise otherwise lawfully in the country may be seized under section
592 only if a district director determines that the violator appears
to be insolvent, that his assets are beyond the jurisdiction of the
United States, or that seizure is .otherwise necessary to protect the
revenue. 121 In other instances, monetary penalties are assessed.
Customs initiates the penalty process by sending the person
involved-the respondent-a "pre-penalty notice" informing him
of Customs' intention to assess penalties under section 592 if he
fails to demonstrate within 30 days that such penalties would be
improper. 122 After receiving the notice, the respondent, using informal procedures, may persuade the district director that a violation has not occurred or that the assessment of the penalty would
inappropriate for some other reason. 123 If the district director

be

117
The value of the goods imposed as a penalty is "domestic valuen (roughly the price at
which the same merchandise would be purchased in the United States) rather than the value
used to assess import duties. 19 C.F.R. § 162.43(a) (1977).
118
The American Importers Association cites an example in which Customs allegedly lost
about 1)200 in revenue because of negligent conduct but assessed a penalty of 1~135,000.
American Importers Association, Why Customs Penalty Statute (Sec. 592) JHust Be Changed!
(unpublished position paper on file with the Administrative Conference of the United States,
Washington, D.C.). The Wall Street Journal reports penalty assessments of 1~ 110 million
against Electronic Memories and Magnetic Corp., 1H3 million against Control Data Corp.,
1H2.5 million against Standard-Kollsman Industries, Inc., and $40 million against Mattei,
Inc. Wall St. J., Mar. ll, 1975, at 42, col. I.
119
If merchandise seized under se.ction 592 is worth less than $50,000, it may be released
to the owner if the owner deposits with Customs the full value of the merchandise in cash or
a letter of credit. !d. § 162.44(a).
128
/d. § 162.41(a).
121
42 Fed. Reg. 25,323 (1977) as amended by 42 Fed. Reg. 27,599 (1977).
122
If the penalty assessment is less than $25,000, no pre-penalty notice is given; the
importer is first notified of the alleged violation when he receives a penalty assessment
notice. 19 C.F.R. §§ 102.31, 171.1(b) (1977).
123
Decisions to assess penalties for section 592 violations are made by district directors,
who determine whether a violation has occurred and whether the violation is of sufficient
magnitude to warrant penalty proceedings. Often, violations perceived to be non-negligent
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remains unconvinced, he issues a claim of penalty, a form similar to
the pre-penalty notice, assessing the full penalty and demanding
payment.
After receiving a claim of penalty, the respondent may invoke
the mitigation procedures provided under section 618 of the Tariff
Act of 1930, which gives the Secretary of the Treasury (and Customs as his delegate) the authority to mitigate forfeitures and
penalties upon such terms and conditions as he considers just and
reasonable. 124 To invoke these procedures, the respondent files a
petition demonstrating that a violation has not occurred or that the
penalty should be reduced. If the penalty assessment exceeds
$25,000, the Office of Regulations and Rulings decides whether
and how much to mitigate the penalty, basing its decision on
information submitted by the respondent and on a written report
from the district director. 125 Such decisions are discretionary and
non reviewable .126
During this process, the respondent generally is given opportunities to discuss the facts of the case with the district director or
other decision-maker and to present written information and argument. No formal record is kept, however, and the importer has
no formal opportunity to challenge the information relied
on against him. If the information is contained in an investigative
report compiled by a Customs agent, the importer normally sees
only a summary of the information. No statement of the facts or
legal principles underlying the decision is made. 127
Because the assessed ·penalty is almost always disproportionate to
. the culpability of the respondent or the loss of revenue resulting
from the violation, Customs virtually always offers to mitigate the
or "technical" are settled without a penalty assessment by permitting the importer to correct
the entry documents and pay the revenue deficiency. The district director's decision to assess
a penalty is based in part upon information assembled by a Customs investigating agent.
124
19 u.s.c. § 1618 (1970).
125
If the penalty assessment is less than $25,000, decisions concerning mitigation ·are
made by the director of the district in which the goods were entered. 19 C.F.R. § 171.21
(1977).
126
See, e.g., United States v. One 1961 Cadillac Hardtop Automobile, 337 F.2d 730 (6th
Cir. 1964) (federal courts have no jurisdiction to grant remission or mitigation for forfeiture
of car used in illegal transportation of narcotics). Contra, United States v. One 1974 Mercury
Cougar Automobile, 397 F. Supp. 1325 (C. D. Cal. 1975).
127
Mitigation decisions are formalized by notifying the respondent of the amou.nt to
which Customs is willing to mitigate the penalty. The form letter used for this purpose
contains no explanation of the basis of the determination. If dissatisfied with this mitigation
offer, respondent may file a supplemental petition for mitigation. 19 C.F.R. § 171.33 (1977).

1977]

1133

LAW & POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS

penalty. 128 But such offers to mitigate present the respondent with
a hard choice. V'l!hile the respondent may acquiesce in Customs'
decision on the violation and pay the mitigated penalty in settlement of the claim, if he does, he forfeits his right to judicial review.
On the other hand, in order to obtain judicial review of the Service's determination the respondent must forego the benefit of
mitigation and risk incurring the entire penalty. 129 This dilemma,
more often th~m not, pressures the respondent into accepting the
mitigation offer, and as a consequence few section 592 penalty
assessments are effectively subject to judicial review. 130 This
amounts to what one writer has termed "administrative blackmaiJ."131
By assessing a penalty and then offering to compromise
128
1n 1974, in an effort to increase public understanding of section 592 procedures, the
Department of the Treasury published internal guidelines governing such mitigation decisions by Customs. Guidelines for the Remission or Mitigation of Fmfeitures and Claims for Forfeiture
Value, 39 Fed. Reg. 39,06! (1974). In general, the guidelines contemplate that penalties will
be mitigated to an amount which reflects the revenue loss resulting from the violation and
the culpability of the defendant, taking into account such factors as any contributory error
by Customs personnel, respondent's cooperation with Customs investigators, and remedial
action taken by the respondent. Customs may reduce penalty assessments to an amount
equivalent to the revenue loss resulting from the violation if voluntary disclosure of a
violation is made before an investigation has been initiated. 19 C.F.R § 171.1 (1977).
9
"
See 19 U.S.C. § 1592 (1970). However, in an unreported decision, Andean Credit, S.A.
v. United States, No. 73-1294-CIV-WM (S.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 1973), the court refused to
order forfeiture of a yacht valued at over 1) 1 million, which it stated would be "so severe a
penalty as to be shocking to the conscience of this Court." Instead, the court ordered
payment of unpaid duties, which amounted to 1~60,000.
130
The pressure to compromise claims is demonstrated by the following information
compiled by William Dickey, formerly Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for
Enforcement, Operations, and Tariff Affairs, comparing the original penalty assessments in
randomly selected section 592 cases \\~th the amount to which the assessment was mitigated:

(in dollars)
Mitigated Amount
Penalty
i'vlitigated Amount
12,431
34,785
193,400
3,944
5,413
150,876
23,673
3,244
2,202,413
88,000
13,275
5,510,450
250
30,888
4,714,811
See Dickey 11, supra note 112, at 703-05.
131
Nelson, Administrative Blackmail: The Remission of Penalties,<! WEST. PoL. Q. 610, 620
(1951). The author referred to use of authority to mitigate penalties by administrative
agencies in general. See also Murphy, Money Penalties-An Administrative Sword of Damocles,2
SANTA CLARA LAw. ll3 (1962). Statutes imposing monetary penalties and authorizing administrative agencies to remit or mitigate the penalty are common. See Gellhorn, Administrative Prescription and Imposition of Penalties, 1970 WASH. U .L.Q. 265 (1970).
Penaliy
179,398
1,770,855
345,000
219,741
2,210,706
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or mitigate, [an agency] may induce the defendant to
settle his alleged liability in order to avoid the risk of
incurring the full penalty in a court proceeding. As a
result the defendant is often penalized without even an
administrative hearing. The safeguard of court review to
protect the rights of defendants is bargained away. Court
review, however, is intended to serve another purpose. It
is the means of confining the actions of errant administrators, of holding them true to the policies laid down by
the legislature. The only means of involving this supervi- ·
sian is litigation. If the litigants are bought off, the administrators are free to shape policy as they please .132

If a party against whom penalties have been assessed refuses to
pay the original or a mitigated penalty, the case is referred to a
U.S. attorney for the institution of forfeiture proceedings in a
district court. The respondent may be afforded another opportunity to settle the case for less than the penalty amount (even for less
than the mitigation amount offered by Customs) .133 Respondents
who seek judicial review of penalty assessments face an additional
burden in forfeiture proceedings. In such proceedings, the government need only show probable cause for the institution of the
suit; if it does, the burden is on the respondent to prove that the
penalty statute was not violated. 134
·
juDICIAL REviEw oF CusToMs AcTION
Overview

The Customs Court and U.S. district courts share responsibility
for reviewing action taken by the Customs Service. 135 District
132

Nelson, supra note 120, at 611-12 (footnote deleted).
Some attorneys advise their clients not to accept mitigation offers made by Customs
because they feel the U.S. attorneys generally offer better settlement terms. There are no
procedures governing such settlements.
134 See 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1970); United States v. Alcatex, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 129, 134
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). See also United States v. Nephrite Jade, 325 F. Supp. 986, 989 (W.D. Mo.
1970).
135 In addition, a co1.1rt of appeals reviews decisions of the Secretary of the Treasury to
revol<e or suspend a broker's license. 19 U.S.C. § 1641(b) (1970). This article does not
consider the adequacy or propriety of judicial review in such instances. No provision governs
judicial review of decisions to deny a license, which are made by the Commissioner uf
Customs and reviewed ,by the Secretary of the Treasury.
133
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courts hear cases in which the Service seeks to coHect liquidated
damages for violation of the terms of a bond, or seeks forfeiture of
merchandise under a· provision authorizing seizure, or seeks to
collect a penalty. The Customs Court has no jurisdiction oversuch
cases.
In other cases, division of jurisdiction between the Customs
Court and district courts is governed by the following considerations. The subject matter jurisdiction of the Customs Courtl 36 is
delineated by statute-the court has exclusive jurisdiction to review those Customs actions that are subject to a protest, and to hear
appeals by U.S. manufacturers, producers, or wholesalers that are
authorized under section 516 of the Tariff Act of. 1930. The
Customs Court has no jurisdiction to revievv Custo-ms actions not
subject to a protest or petition and may not take jurisdiction over
those actions that are subject thereto until a protest (by an importer) or a petition (by a U.S. manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler)
has been filed and denied. "Final judgments or orders" of the
Customs Court are reviewed by the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals. 137
Cong:ress has not explicitly provided for review of Customs actions that are not subject to protest or petition. District courts often
exercise their general and special jurisdictional powers to review
such actions.
Thus, when Customs action does not involve a penalty, forfeiture, or liquidated damages-matters over which only the district
courts have jurisdiction-the jurisdiction of the Customs Court
controls the division of responsibility between that court and district courts. Because jurisdiction in the Customs Court is available
only to those persons authorized to file a protest or petition, and is
not available until a protest or petition is denied by Customs, the
prereqtiisites to st!it in th.e Ct1sto1ns CoLrrt also li1nit standing to
challenge certain Customs actions as well as the timing of judicial
review.

136 On the Customs Court generally seeR. STURM, A MANUAL OF CusTOMS LAW 12 (1974);
Johnson, The United States Customs Court-Its History, jurisdiction, and Procedure, 7 OKLA. L.
REV. 393 (1954); Rao,A Primer on Customs Court Practice,40 BROOKLYN L. REv. 581 (1974).
137
28 U .S.C. § 1541 (a) (1970).
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Customs Court jurisdiction

1. Suits by importers
For importers, brokers, and others involved in the importing
process, access to the Customs Court is controlled by the protest
procedure at Customs. The Customs Court has jurisdiction over
suits by importers only if the importer has filed a protest, the
protest has been denied by Customs, and the importer has paid all
liquidated duties, charges, or exactions. 138
The subjects over which the Customs Court has jurisdiction in a
suit by an importer include all matters subject to a protest under
the protest provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1514, and none others. The
Customs Court's jurisdictional statute provides:
§ 1582 Jurisdiction of the Customs Court
(a) The Customs C~urt shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions instituted by any person whose protest
pursuant to the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, has been
denied, in whole or in part, by the appropriate customs
officers, where the administrative decision, including the
legality of all orders and findings entering into the same,
involves: (1) the appraised value of merchandise; (2) the
classification and rate and amount of duties chargeable;
(3) all charges or exactions of whatever character within
the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Treasury; (4) the
exclusion of merchandise from entry or delivery under
any provisions of the customs laws; (5) the liquidation or
reliquidation of an entry, or a modification thereof; (6) the
refusal to pay a claim for drawback; or (7) the refusal to
reliquidate an entry under section 520(c) of the Tariff Act
of 1930, as amended. 139

With respect to these areas, the jurisdiction of the Customs Court is
exdusive. 140 Thus, a suit brought in a district court to review any of
138

Protests are filed in accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1514 (1970), which specifies the seven
types of Customs action that are subject to a protest. Actions subject to a protest under this
section are identical to those over which the Customs Court has jurisdiction under 28 U .S.C.
§ 1582 (1970).
139 28 U .S.C. § 1582(a) ( i 970).
140 Id. The exclusivity of Customs Court jurisdiction is reconfirmed by 28. U .S.C. § 1340
(1970), which grants district courts original jurisdiction over "any civil action arising under
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the types of administrative actions listed in the seven subparagrahs
of section l582(a) is subject to dismissal for lack of su.bject matter
jurisdiction. 141
Actions by the Customs Service not subjett to protest under
section 1514 (and thus not within the seven subparagraphs of the
court's jurisdictional statute) are not subject to review in the Customs Court. For example, although the Customs Court has jurisdiction to review actions excluding merchandise under a customs
bw,H 2 actions excluding merchandise under a law that is not a
customs law are not subject to a protest or to review under section
1582, and hence are not reviewable by the Customs Court. 143
Similarly, navigation fees and certain inspection fees collected by
the Customs Service are not "charges or exactions ... '".rithin the
jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Treasury" and are subject to
neither a protest nor an appeal in the Customs Court. 144
any Act of Congress providing for internal revenue, or revenue from imports on tonnage,
except matters within the jurisdiction of the Customs Court" (emphasis supplied).
141
Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Comm. for the Implementation of
Textile Agreements, No. 76-1064 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 20, 1977), petition Jot 12hcan'rzg d2nic:d (D.C.
Cir. Sept. 2, 1977); SC:M Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 549 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(directing district court to retain jurisdiction until Customs Court ruled on its own jurisdiction); Fritz v. United States, 535 F.2d 1192 (9th Cir. 1976); J.C. Penney Co. v. United States
Treasury Dep't, 439 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. !97!), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971); Kocher v.
Fowler, 397 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 920 (1968); N. Am. Cement
Corp. v. Anderson, 284 F.2d 591 (D.C. Cir. 1960); E. States Petroleum Corp. v. Rogers, 280
F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Morgantown Glassware Guild v. Humphrey, 236 F.2d 6'70 (D.C.
Cir. 1956), cerl. denied, 352 U.S. 896 (1956); Boston Wool Trade Ass'n v. Snyder, 161 F.2d
648 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Cottman Co. v. Dailey, 94 F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1938); Riccomini v. United
States, 69 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1934); Kreutz v. Durning, 69 F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1934); Akins v.
Saxbe, 380 F. Supp. 1210 (N.D. Maine 1974); Altieri v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 458
(D.P.R. 1969); Horton v. Humphrey, 146 F. Supp. 819 (D.D.C. 1956); Nat'! Sanitary Rag Co.
v. Hamilton, 4 F. Supp. 642 (N.D. Cal. !933).
HZ See, e.g., Consumers Union of the United States, lnc. v. Comm. for the Implementation of Textile Agreements, No. 76-l 064 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 20, ! 977), petition for rehearing
denied (D.C. Cir. Sept. 2, 1977) (exclusion under voluntary quota is within exclusive jurisdiction of Customs Court); Benrus Watch Co. v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 191 (Cust. Ct.
1964) (exclusion for failure to mark watch movements).
113
See, e.g., V.G. Nahrgang v. United States, T.D. 47,13,1, 65 TREAS. DEc. 1095 (1934)
(refusal of Customs to release imports found adulterated by Food and Drug Administration
not subject to Customs Court review). But see Karl Schroff & Assocs. v. United States, 47
Cust. Ct. 339 (1961) (government agrees to release merchandise excluded under copyright
statute after protest and Customs Court suit; jurisdiction of court not questioned).
H< See Puget Sound Freight Lines v. United States, 36 C.C.P.A. 70 (1949) (navigation fees
and charges under 19 U .S.C. § 58 (1970) are not "exactions within the jurisdiction of the
Treasury," and thus are not subject to Customs Court review); Louis Rube v. United States,
T.D. 26,936, 10 TREAS. DEC. 737 (1905), Aff'd, T.D. 27,773, 12 TREAS. DEC. 612 (1906)
(inspection fee imposed by Department of Agriculture not reviewable in Customs Court).
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When Customs assesses liquidated damages for breach of the
conditions of an import bond, the Customs Court will normally
review the assessment since the liquidated damages are construed
to be a "charge or exaction . . . within the jurisdiction of the
Secretary of the Treasury" and therefore subject to both protest
under section 1514 and review in the Customs Court under section
1582. 145 The Customs Court has jurisdiction to review whether
liquidated damages were lawfully assessed for failure to redeliver
merchandise to Customs upon demand, 146 failure to submit entry
documents within the time specified in a bond for immediate
release privileges, 147 and failure to submit proper proof of
exportation for merchandise entered temporarily.14 8 However, the
Customs Court considers only whether the conditions of the bond
were violated~ It may not review the amount of the liquidated
damages set in the bond and assessed by Customs since that is a
"legislative matter" that is "within the control of the administrative
officers." 149
The protest requirement limits the jurisdiction of the Customs
Court in other ways. The following Customs actions are not subject
to protest or tq review in the Customs Court: refusal to grant, and
suspension of, immediate delivery privileges; 150 refusal to grant, or
revocation of, a license to perform _the duties of a public gauger or
bonded warehouseman; 151 denial of a customhouse broker's
license; 152 and decisions concerning the amount of a bond required
to be filed. 153
Such actions are reviewable in a district court. See, e.g., Carriso, Inc. v. United States, 106
F.2d 707 (9th Cir. 1939).
145
However, to be reviewable in the Customs Court the exaction "must relate in some
manner to imported merchandise and affect the importer, consignee, or agent of such
imported merchandise." Universal Carloading and Distributing Co., Abstract 35,743, 71
TREAS. DEc. I 083 ( 1936) (Customs Court declines jurisdiction to review imposition of
liquidated damages against bonded carrier for failure to deliver merchandise).
146
Huber v. United States, 29 Cust. Ct. 92 (1952) rev'd on other grounds,41 C.C.P.A. 69
(1953). But see Klein v. United States, T.D. 47,281, 66 TREAS. DEc. 297 (1934).
147
J.M. Altieri v. United States, 46 Cust. Ct. 307 (1961).
148
Arthur Cook v. United States, 6 Cust. Ct. 114 (1941); Guy Barkam Co. v. United
States, 7 Cust. Ct. 155 (1941).
149
United States v. Frank F. Smith & Co., 25 C.C.P.A. !63, 167-68 (1937).
150
See text accompanying notes 21-28 supra.
151
See notes 30 and 34 supra.
152
See note 135 supra.
153 American Askania Corp. v. United States, 10 Cust. Ct. 76 (1943). See text accompanying note 40 supra. In addition, the ability of the Customs Court to correct erroneous Customs
action has been limited because the Customs Court has held that the Customs actions
involved are discretionary and therefore not subject to review. For example, Customs, as
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2. Suits by U.S. Competitors
The Customs Court also has exclusive jurisdiction -when a
petition filed by a U.S. manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler
under section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930 15 ~ is denied. 155 This
permits judicial review of the same matters that are subject to a
petition under section 516: decisions concerning appraisement,
dassiJl.cation, or rates of duty, including antidumping and
countervailing duties; a finding by the Secretary of the Treasury of
no sales or likelihood of sales at less than fair value under the
Antidumping Act of 1921; 56 and a finding by the Secretary of the
Treasury under the Countervailing Duty Act 157 that no bounty or
grant was bestowed on imports. District courts have no jurisdiction
to review these matters. 158
However, the procedures leading to review in the Customs Court
are not available unless the challenged decision relates to
delegate of the Secretary of the Treasury, is authorized to abate or refund duties on
merchandise destroyed while in Customs' custody. See 19 U .S.C.§ 1563 (1970). The Customs
Court has held that it has no authority either to grant such refund if Customs has declined
to do so, or to review the merits of Customs' decisions. Deila Failde v. United States, 388 F.
Supp. 564 (Cust. Ct. 1963); Michaelian & Kohlberg v. United States, 65 TREAS. DEc. 1372
(1934). Other cases have acknowledged the court's power to determine wht:,ther Customs
actions under this provision exceed its authority or fail to comply witl1 the terms of the
statute, but without indicating that the power would be used to control Customs action
effectively. D.M. Ferry & Co. v. United States, 85 F. 550,557 (6th Cir. 1898); H.Z. Bernstein
Co. v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1364, 1371 (Cust. Ct. 1958). But see Art Craft Jewelry Co.
v. United States, 64 Cust. Ct. 414, 418 (1970) (without considering right to review, court
apparently held plaintiff's claim invalid as a matter of law).
However, the scope of review of such discretionary functions was changed recently when
the court. adopted Administrative Procedure Act standards for judicial review of discretionary action. Suwanee Steamship Co. v. United States, C.D. 4708 (Cust. Ct. July 18, 1977).
The appropriate scope of review of discretionary actions is not considered in this Article.
154
See text accompanying notes 68-70 supra. Actions challenging denial of a petition are
given precedence in the Customs Court and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. 28
u.s.c. §§ 2633, 2602 (1970).
"" 28 U.S.C. § l582(b) (1970).
15
" 19 U.S.C. § 160 (Supp. V 1975). The Act authorizes the imposition of a special
dumping duty on imports found to have been sold at less than fair value if a U.S. industry is
being or is likely to be injured by reason of the importation. The Act also authorizes the
imposition of countervailing duties to offse't the amount of bounties or grants bestowed
upon imported merchandise.
157
Id. § 1303. Section 516 also permits a U.S. manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler to
seek review of Customs decisions not to impose special marking duties under 19 U .S.C. §
!304 (1970). Diamond Match Co. v. United States, 44 Cust. Ct. 67 (1960). See note 81 supra
and accompanying text.
153
See Calf Leather Tanners' Ass'n v. Morganthau, 80 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
297 U.S. 718 ( 1936). But see discussion of Timken v. Simo11, note 196 ir~fra and accompanying
text.
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merchandise that is the same class or kind as that dealt in by the
U.S. firm bringing the challenge. Actions of the Customs Service
that are not subject tci challenge under section 516 may ,not be
challenged in the Customs Court. 159
Character and Powers

if the

Customs Court

The Customs Court has been designated by Congress as "a court
established under Article III of the Constitution" 160 and is composed of nine judges appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate. The judges hold office for life during
good behavior. 161 Legislation provides that no more than five
judges may be appointed from the same political party and that the
chief judge is to be designated "from time to time" by the President.162
The court has national jurisdiction, encompassing controversies
arising in any state or territory of the United States. Although the
court is located in New York City, it is empowered to, and does,
hold trials or hearings at any port or place within its jurisdiction. 163
Moreover, the chief judge may order a judge of the court to
preside at an evidentiary hearing in a foreign country, unless such
hearings are prohibited by the laws of such country. 164
The court has been given all the powers of a district court for
preserving order, compelling the attendance of witnesses, and requiring the production of evidence, 165 and the rules of the Customs Court provide a full system of pre-trial discovery from parties
and nonparties, including the production of documents, requests
159
E.C. Miller Cedar Lumber Co. v. United States, 86 F.2d 429, 434 (C.C.P.A. 1936)
(decisions concerning measure, weight, and quantities of imported merchandise, which
determine duty assessments, not subject to challenge).
160
28 U .S.C. § 251 (1970). This provision was enacted to overrule Ex Parte Bakelite Corp.,
279 U.S. 438 (1929}, which held that the Court of Customs Appeals (the predecessor of the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals) was a legislative court not established under Article
Ill of the Constitution. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1965).
161
28 U .S.C § 252 (Supp. V 1975).
162
28 u.s.c § 251 (1970).
163 Id. § 256; CusT. CT. R. 2.2(a).
164
28 u.s.c. § 256 (1970).
165 Jd. § 1581. See also id. § 2637 (witnesses; inspection of documents). The court's
authority to impose sanctions for failure to respond to discovery requests is articulated in
CusT. CT. R. 6.5(b)(2). See, e.g., Gehrig, Hoban & Co. v. United States, 76 Cust. Ct. 277
(1976). The court may also punish persons for criminal contempt of court under 18 U .S.C.§
401 (1970). Holt v. United States, 41 C.C.P.A. "8 (1953); In re Spector, 42 Cust. Ct. 726
(1959).
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for admissions, interrogatories and depositions, 166 as well as complete motion practice. 167 Cases are usually heard and decided by a
single judge, but the chief judge may appoint three judges to hear
and decide cases involving a constitutional question or an issue with
"broad or significant" implications. 168
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Customs
Court itself have often said that the Customs Court lacks "equity"
jurisdiction and "equity power." 169 What is meant by such statements is far from clear; the decisions convey at least two different
meanings. In one sense, the statement that the Customs Court has
no equity power signifies that the Customs Court lacks jurisdiction
to review administrative action before a protest has been filed and
denied. 170 As so understood, the Customs Court's lack of equity
power invites consideration of whether-and under what
circumstances-the Customs Court should be authorized to intervene in the administrative process prior to filing and denial of a
protest. That question is covered by the recommendations set forth
later in this article.
Other decisions referring to the lack of equity power in the
Customs Court have done so in a different context, indicating that
the Customs Court will adhere to procedural statutes or regulations
even when a strict interpretation leads to unexpected or unjust
results. 171 These cases suggest that Customs should adopt a more
flexible approach when substantial interests otherwise would suffer
because of harmless, inadvertent procedural errors, 172 but they do
CusT. CT. R. 6.
!d. R. 4. See generally Rao, A Primer on Customs Court Practice, 40 BROOKLYN L. REv. 581
(1974).
168
28 u.s.c. § 255 (1970).
169
See, e.g., Eurasia Import Co. v. United States, 31 C.C.P.A. 202, 211 (I 944) and cases
cited in notes 170 and 172 infra.
170
See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States Treasury Dep't, 67 Cust. Ct. 328
(1971), affd, 485 F.2d 1402 (C.C.P.A. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 21 (1973) (Customs Court
denied its own equity power by refusing to invoke All Writs Act to review administrative
action not subject to protest but allegedly ripe for review).
171
See, e.g., Bullocks, Inc. v. United States, 7 Cust. Ct. 12 (1941) (although error occurred
because Customs officer failed to mark documents properly Customs not required to reliquidate entries pursuant to a prior judgment); Olaf V. Sundt v. United States, 4 Cust. Ct.
114 ( 1940) (Customs Court has no "equity powers" to hear claim for remission of dutie~
· when petition for remission was filed just after the 60 day deadline).
172
The other cases in which the "equity power" of the Court has been denied also reflect
strict adherence to provisions of law, despite plaintiffs claim that the result is inequitable.
Cummins-Collins Distilleries v. United States, 36 C.C.P.A. 88 (I 949) (rejecting plaintiffs
claim that it is inequitable to require plaintiff to pay higher duty after goods have been sold
at price calculated to include only low estimated duty); Carl Matusek Shipping Co. v. United
166
167
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not suggest that the Customs Court's jurisdiction should be
changed and would not be affected by the recommendations in this
article.
When the Customs Court does have jurisdiction following the
denial of a protest or petition, it is unclear whether the court has
the power to issue injunctions or writs of mandamus. 173 The court
has never issued a writ in those circumstances; nor has it been
asked to do so, but there is authority to the effect that it could do
so. Under the All Writs Act 174 "all courts of the United States" (and
thus the Customs Court) 175 have the right to issue writs in aid of
their respective jurisdictions. The Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals has issued writs under this Act in both patent and customs
cases, 176 and it is likely that, were it faced with the issue, the
Customs Court would hold that once it has jurisdiction it is authorized to issue writs in appropriate cases under the All Writs Act.
In any event, the recommendations of this article would confer
explicit authority on the Customs Court to issue injunctions.
It is also unclear whether the Customs Court may issue declaratory judgments. In an early case, Eurasia Import Co. v. United
States, 331 F. Supp. 1386 (Cust. Ct. 1963) (plaintiffs failure to file proper form is sufficieilt
reason to deny drawbacks); Gilbert W. Greene v. United States, 13 Cust. Ct. 237 (1944) (no
"equity power" to consider importer's claim that he would have been exempt from duties
had he not followed Customs' erroneous advice with respect to filing of forms).
Other cases have required strict adherence to procedural rules without referring to the
Court's lack of "equity power." American Mail Lines, Ltd. v. United States, 34 C.C.P.A. I
(1946) (protest dismissed because grounds relied upon at trial were different from those
contained in protest); Nikko Boeki, lnt'l, Inc. v. United States, 71 Cust. Ct. 16 (1973)
(protests dismissed because filed three days prior to liquidation; protest to be valid must be
filed after liquidation); Best Foods, Inc. v. United States, I 4 7 F. Supp. 749 (Cust. Ct. I 956)
(same).
173
The Matsushita case, supra note I 70, did not address that precise issue. There, the
Customs Court held that it could not exercise power under the All Writs Act until after the
jurisdictional prerequisite of a denied protest had been satisfied. See also Dexter v. United
States, II CusT. BuLL. 50 (Cust. Ct. Feb. 9, I 977).
174
28 U.S.C. § 165I(a) (1970).
175
Id. § 451. Moise Products Co. v. United States, 37 Cust. Ct. 135 (1956).
176
United States v. Boe, 543 F.2d 151 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals has jurisdiction under All Writs Act to order Chief judge of Customs Court not to
take jurisdiction); Cook v. Dann, 522 F.2d 1276 (C.C.P.A. I 975) (asserting court's power to
issue writs, but refusing to exercise such power in absence of executive abuse of discretion);
Import Motors, Ltd. v. Int'I Trade Comm'n, 530 F.2d 937 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (enjoining the
International Trade Commission from precluding plaintiff from hearing in a section 337
proceeding), vacated, 530 F.2d 940 (C.C.P.A. 1975); Wei! v. Dann, 503 F.2d 562 (C.C.P.A.
I 974) (asserting court's power to issue writs, but refusing to exercise power where-it would
not foster effective appellate review); Loshbaugh v. Allen, 404 F.2d 1400 (C.C.P.A.
I 969) (acknowledging mandamus power, but refusing to suspend a proceeding before the
Commissioner of Patents).
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States, 177 the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals stated in dicturn
that the Customs Court could not issue declaratory judgments, but
did not expressly consider the effect of the Declaratory Judgment
Act. That statute provides that:

In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction,
except with respect to Federal taxes, any court of the United
States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may
declare the right§ and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration (emphasis supplied).l18
In a subsequent decision, the Customs Court, without referring to
Eurasia, indicated that it could issue declaratory judgments but
declined to do so on the ground that it would be improper under
the circumstances .179 These are the only two cases dealing with the
Customs Court's authority to issue declaratory judgments.
District Court jurisdiction

As a result of the statutory limitations on Customs Court jurisdiction, certain Customs actions may be reviewable only in a federal
district court. Suits seeking forfeiture, monetary penalties, or
liquidated damages under i:i bond are brought in a district court. If
Customs seizes goods, but has not initiated forfeiture or .condemnation proceedings, the district court has jurisdiction to require Customs to do so. 180 The Customs Court does not have jurisdiction in
cases involving forfeiture or penalties, even if a protest against the
exclusion of mercharttlise has been filed and denied. 181
177

31 C.C.P.A. 202 (I 944).
28 u.s.c. § 2201 (1970).
170
Moise Products Co. v. United States, 37 Cust. Ct. 135 (1956)(declaratory judgment is
improper when plaintiff is seeking an interlocutory ruling on law to be applied at administrative level). It is established that controversies concerning import duties do not concern
"Federal taxes" and are not outside the Declaratory Judgment Act for that reason. See
Algonquin SNG, Inc. v. Federal Energy Administration, 426 U.S. 548 (1976). It is unclear
what effect, if any, United States v. King, 395 U.S. I (1969), has on this question. There, the
Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Claims, which is also "a court of the United States"
could not issue declaratory judgments, but that holding was based on the unique position
and history of the Court of Claims.
180
In reNo. 32 E. 50-7th St., 96 F.2d ~53, 156 (2d Cir. 1938); In re Behrens, 39 F.2d 561,
563 (2d Cir. 1930).
181
United States v. American Metal Co., 12 Ct. Cust. App. 440, 444 (1 925); Sheldon &
Co. v. United States, 8 Ct. Cust. App. 215, 218 (1917); M.M. Scher & Sons, Inc. v. United
178
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District Court jurisdiction over other Customs actions is dependent upon an interpretation of Customs Court jurisdiction: district
courts may take jurisdiction under one of their general or specific
jurisdictional provisions 182 when the Customs Court does not have
·jurisdiction over the subject matter. This occurs most frequently
when Customs excludes merchandise under a law that is not a
custo~s- law-action subject neither to a protest nor to review in
the Customs Court. Under this scheme, district courts have subject
matter jurisdiction to review exclusion of merchandise under the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (a decision made by the Food and
Drug Administration); 183 exclusion of goods such as switchblade
knives (a decision made by Customs); 184 exclusion of oil pursuant
to a quota imposed by the President under section 22 of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act; 185 and under former procedures,
exclusion of goods which allegedly copy a registered trademark (a
decision made by Customs) .186
Interestingly, when district courts have jurisdiction over Customs
action, they may provide immediate relief against unlawful Customs action before administrative procedures surrounding a protest or petition are completed. 187 In those situations, district courts
States, 24 Cust. Ct. 243 (1950)(mhigated penalty is not an exaction subject to protest or
review).
1 8 2 28 U .S.C. § 1331 (1970) (where matter in controversy "arises under the Constitution,
laws or treaties of the United States"); id. § 1340 (matters "arising under any Act of Congress
providing for internal revenue, or revenue from imports or tonnage except matters within
the jurisdiction of the Customs Court"); id. § 1346(a)(2) ("any other civil action or claim
against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the
Constitution, or any Act of Congress").
183 Sugarman v. Forbragd, 405 F.2d 1189, 1190 (9th Cir. 1968) (review of FDA order
excluding allegedly adulterated coffee beans); The James]. Hill, 65 F. Supp. 265, 269 (D.
Md. 1946) (review of FDA order to export or destroy wheat); Goodwin v. United States, 371
F. Supp. 433, 436 (S.D. Cal. 1972) (exclusion by FDA).
18 ' Precise Imports Corp. v. Kelly, 218 F. Supp. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (exclusion of
switchblade knives under criminal statute), aff'd, 378 F.2d 1014 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
u.s. 973 (1967).
185 C. Tennant Sons & Co. of New York v. Dill, 158 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
186 Croton Watch Co. v. Laughlin, 208 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1953) (exclusion under trademark
laws). See also Richard]. Spitz, Inc. v. Dill, 140 F. Supp. 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (district court
has jurisdiction to consider exclusion made under Foreign Assets Control Regulations);
Carriso, Inc. v. United States, 106 F.2d 707 (9th Cir. 1939) (district courts have jurisdiction
to challenge certain navigation fees collected by Customs).
187 See Croton Watch Co. v. Laughlin, 208 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1953); Richard]. Spitz, Inc. v.
Dill, 140 F. Supp. 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). Indeed, one of the reasons importers attempt to
invoke district cou~t jurisdiction is to avoid the procedural prerequisites of Customs Court
jurisdiction. See, e.g., J .C. Penney Co. v. United States Treasury Dep't, 439 F.2d 63 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).
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have greater ability to control administrative action than does the
Customs Court, which must wait until a protest or petition is filed
and denied before assuming jurisdiction.
When the subject matter under challenge is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Customs Court, it is generally held that the
district court has no jurisdiction, 188 even if the Customs Court is
unable to hear the case because procedural prerequisites have not
been completed. 189 Cases to. that effect are premised on the notion
that Congress intended the Customs Court to offer a "complete
system of corrective justice" 190 in matters over which it has jurisdiction. Therefore, the prerequisites for Customs Court review are
taken as limitations on judicial review of Customs actions by district
courts. Persons not ·authorized to oetition or orotest subiect
matter
J
within the Customs Court's jurisdiction may not challenge such
action in the district court. 191 Persons for whom the protest or
petition procedures might someday be available may not challenge
Customs action in the district court without invoking those procedures, even if the Customs Court remedy is alleged to be ineffective .192
A few decisions have stated that in "exceptional and extraordinary" circumstances a district court might properly enjoin Customs
Service action if such action threatened irreparable injury, even
though the subject matter was within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Customs Court. 1 93 However, this exception has never been
•

J

188

See cases cited in note 129 supra. In at least one case, a district court has reviewed
administrative action that would normally be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Customs Court without considering the jurisdictional issue. Norman G. Jensen, Inc. v.
United States, 355 F. Supp. 466 (D. Minn. I 973) (in declaratory judgment action, court ruled
that Customs Service had lawfully imposed duties on imported merchandise that was not
later exported as promised).
109
See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 549 F.2d 812, 815 (D.C. Cir. 19771: !.C.
Penney Co. v. United States Treasury Dep't, supra note 174; Fritz v. United States, 535 F.2d
1192 (9th Cir. 1976).
190 Argosy, Ltd. v. Hennigan, 404 F.2d 14,20-21 (5th Cir. 1968) (quoting Cottman Co. v.
Dailey, 94 F.2d 85, 88 (4th Cir. 1938)).
101
See Kocher v. Fowler, 397 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. I 967), cerl. denied, 391 U.S. 920 ( 1968);
Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Comm. for the Implementation of Textile
Agreements, No. 76-1064 (D.C, Cir. Apr. 20, 1977), petition for rehearing denied, (D.C. Cir.
Sept. 2, 1977).
192
J.C. Penney Co. v. United Stales Treasury Dep't, supra note 187. Cf SCM Corp. v. Int'l
Trade Comm'n, 549 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Customs Court must initially rule on its own
jurisdiction before a district court can proceed to exercise jurisdiction).
103
E.g., Argosy, Ltd. v. Hennigan, 404 F.2d 14,21 (5th Cir. 1968); Cottman Co. v. Dailey,
94 F.2d 85, 89 (4th Cir. 1938); Horton v. Humphrey, 146 F. Supp. 819, 821 (D.C.C. 1956).
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invoked. 194 Increasingly courts have recognized that because of the
limitation on its jurisdiction and power the Customs Court may not
provide a "complete system of corrective justice" for matters within
its jurisdiction. Such courts have taken jurisdiction over matters
seemingly within the jurisdiction of the Customs Court, refusing to
hold that limitations on Customs Court jurisdiction necessarily
imply limitations on their own jurisdiction. Thus, even though the
Customs Court normally reviews administrative action of the Secretary of the Treasury under the Antidumping Act of 1921 and
.district courts do not/ 95 in Timken Co. v. Simon, 196 the district court
took jurisdiction over a suit by a U.S. manufacturer to consider
whether a refusal of the Secretary of the Treasury to exact dumping duties on certain importations was lawful. In affirming, the
court of appeals reasoned that because the action was not subject to
a petition under section 516, it was not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Customs Court, thus rejecting the notion that section
516 .limits reviewability of actions not specifically subject to review
through the protect and petition procedures.
Similarly, in Massachusetts v. Simon 197 the district court took
jurisdiction over a suit challenging license fees imposed by the
President on imported oil, even though traditionally the Customs
Court has reviewed Presidential actions which result in increased
duties. 198 Although it is not clear from the opinion, jurisdiction
may have been exercised simply because some of the plaintiffs
before the court could not have filed a protest or challenged the
license fees in the district court. These cases suggest that confusion
concerning the respective jurisdictions of the Customs Court and
district courts will continue as long as the jurisdiction and powers
of the Customs Court are narrowly limited.
194
The narrow scope of this exception is exemplified by Horton v. Humphrey, 146 F.
Supp. 819 (D.D.C. 1956), where the court declined to take jurisdiction even though the
challenged Customs action was alleged to have put plaintiff out of business and Customs
Court review was alleged to be too untimely to provide effective relief.
195
See, e.g., Cottman Co. v. Dailey, 94 F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1938); Horton v. Humphrey, 146
F. Supp. 819 (D.D.C. 1956). Compare 19 U.S.C. § 169 (1970) with id. §1516 (Supp. V 1975).
196
539 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
197
No. 75-0129 (D.D.C. Feb. 21, I 975), rev'd sub no~n., Algonquin SNG, Inc. v. Federal
Energy Administration, 518 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 548 (1976).
198
United States v. Star Indus., Inc. 462 F.2d 557 (C.C.P.A.) (review of duty assessed on
brandy imported from Spain), cerl. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972); United States v. Best Foods,
Inc., 47 C.C.P.A. 163 (1960) (review of fee imposed on peanuts); United States v. Schmidt
Pritchard & Co., 47 C.C.P.A. 152, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 919 (1960) (presidential proclamation
under the escape clause).
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ANALYSIS AND REcoMMENDATioNs

Introduction

Except when it revokes or suspends a broker's license, the Customs Service acts through informal procedures. Decisions are made
and actions are taken without a formal record, without an opportunity to examine or cross-examine witnesses or formally test the
validity of information, without articulated support for decisions,
and without an independent decision-maker. In part, Lhese procedures are required by the nature of the work Customs does. Many
of the functions Customs performs could not be carried out
through formal adjudicatory proceedings at the administrative
level. The assessment and collection of duties, for example, would
absorb an enormous amount of resources if Customs were required
to establish the classification and value of all merchandise in a
formal adjudicatory setting. Informal procedures permit the Customs Service to take action without first demonstrating to an independent trier of fact that the information it relies upon is accurate.
This is generally appropriate because a significant number of issues
resolved by the Service are relatively easy to decide or are noncontroversial. Informal procedures facilitate disposal of most issues
>vithout controversy, and resolution of most controversies without
the burdens of formal proceedings.
On the other hand, much of what Customs does involves adjuclication:199 import specialists, customs inspectors, district directors
and their staffs, and lawyers at headquarters make (even if they do
not articulate) findings of fact and apply general standards
contained in legislation and regulations. 200 Accordingly, the procedural formalities normally associated with a trial-type hearing
may be important to ensure fair and correct determinations.
Tension tl1erefure ex.ists bet•vvee11 t11e need for tl1e adn1i11istrative
systern to be fast and flexible and the need for the safeguards of
more formal adversary proceedings. Present procedures resolve
"'" This is generally true whether "adjudication" is defined as broadly as in section 55 I (7)
of the Administrative Procedure Act ("agency process for the formulation of an order") or
more narrowly and conventionally as Professor Davis would define it (disposition of an issue,
other than by rulemaking, involving legal right or legal obligations of named parties). Sec
Davis, Revisingthe Administrative Procedme Act, 27 An. L. REv. 35, 40 (I977).
200
As long ago as ISIO, Chief Justice Marshall referred to a customs collector (the official
who then assessed duties) as a "quasi-judge." Scott v. Negro Ben, I 0 U.S. (6 Cranch) I, 3
(lSI 0).
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this tension by combining informal administrative procedures with
judicial review for those aggrieved by administrative decisions.
After duties are assessed informally, an importer may protest the
assessment, and if the protest is denied, challenge the assessment in
the Customs Court. There, "review" is a hybrid of review and de
novo adjudication. The Customs Court does not review an administrative record; decisions are based on a record compiled de novo
before it. 201 But this is not, strictly speaking, a trial de novo because
the Customs Court does not make an independent determination
of contested issues. Instead, the action of the Customs Service is
presumed to be correct and the party challenging that action has
the burden of proving that the action is incorrect. 202
The administrative-judicial process just described appears to be
proper in most instances (altl~ough the recommendations of this
article would eliminate the additional burden of proof now borne
by parties challenging Customs action). The present informal
decision-making process should be retained at the administrative
level so that most issues can be disposed of quickly and flexibly.
Resolving disputed issues through judicial proceedings rather than
through formal administrative procedures permits the administrative process to proceed expeditiously, but provides the adversary
context and procedural formalities which are necessary to assure
sound decisions and judicial control over Customs action. At the
same time, the presumption of correctness underlying Customs
decisions facilitates the informal administrative process by shifting
the burden of proof to persons challenging Customs action.
Even though the framework in which issues are raised and resolved appears to be sound, much can be done to improve the
operation of administrative and judicial procedures within that
framework. The informality of the present administrative process
used by Customs places a heavier responsibility on the process of
judicial review than there would otherwise be. A court is the only
forum in which issues arising from administrative action can be
decided in an adversary proceeding by an impartial decisionmaker on the basis of an evidentiary record. Accordingly, judicial
201

However, ·28 U.S.C. § 2632(£) (Supp. V !975) provides that when the summons is
served the Customs Service is to transmit a copy of certain entry documents, the protest and
denial thereof, any laboratory reports, and official samples of the merchandise "as part of
the official record of the civil action" in the Customs Court.
202
!d. § 2635(a).
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review should be available and timely, as well as sufficiently broad
in scope to overturn incorrect administrative action.
Courts improve the administrative process by creating substantive standards for channelling discretionary action and requiring
the agency to develop rules, procedures, and statements of policy.203 The recommendations discussed below would assist the Customs Court in fulfilling that role by broadening its subject matter
jurisdiction, increasing its powers to enable it to grant timely relief,
revising the rules concerning the burden of proof that currently
preclude the reversal of erroneous administrative action, and modifying procedures that preclude judicial review in penalty cases.
There are, however, limits to the ability of a court to structure
administrative discretion or require an agency to do so; 204 it may be
too restrained by resources, natural conservatism, or the complexity of the task to control agency discretion effectively. It is likely
that nonjudicial scrutiny· of administrative procedures themselves
may yield more productive procedural changes than attention focused in the context of an adversary proceeding. While it is recommended that direct attention be given to revising the procedures Customs uses in performing its function, analysis of such
revision is beyond the scope of this article.
Courts are also limited in their "ability to improve administrative
procedures, because their only opportunity to do so is when a
203

K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY jUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 57-59 (1 969); K. DAVIS,
PoLICE DISCRETION 121-38 (1975); Wright, Book Review, 81 YALE L. J. 575 (1972). The
efficacy of judicial control of informal and discretionary agency action is just beginning to be
studied. Freedman, Summary Action by Administrative Agencies, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 55-64
(1972). Sofaer Judicial Control of Informal Discretionary Adjudication and Enforcement, 72
CoLUM. L. REv. 1293 (1972); Thomforde, Controlling Administrative Sanctions, 74 MicH. L.
REV. 709, 734-51 (1976); Vicery,Judicial Review of Informal Agency Action: A Case Study of
Shareholder Proposal Letters, 28 HAST. L.J. 307 (1976); Wright, New Judicial Requisites for
Informal Rulemaking: Implications for the Environmental Impact Statement Process, 29 An. L. REV.
59 (I 977).
204
Sofaer, supra note 203, at 1375; Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
88 HARV. L. REv. 1669, 1696 (1 975); Williams, Securing Fairness and Regularity in Administrative Proceedings, 29 An. L. REV. I, 33 (1977). The Supreme Court almost seems to have
accepted these limitations as precluding effective judicial innovation. See, e.g., Renegotiation
Bd. v. Grumman Airuaft Eng'r Corp., 421 U.S. 168 (1975) (agency need not explain
decisions, even if public interest suffers otherwise); Butz v. Glover Livestock Co., 411 U.S.
I 82 (1 973) (reversing appeals court decision requiring agency to explain inconsistent decisions); Camp v. Pitts, 4 I I U.S. 138 (l 973) (de novo review of informal adjudication not
required); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (formal findings
not required for informal action). But see Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (I 974) (agency must
let standards be known to avoid reality and appearance of arbitrary denial of benefits).
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dispute is brought before them. If persons whose interests an
agency should protect do not, or may not, challenge agency action,
there is no opportunity for judicial correction. 205 This problem is
particularly significant in the administration of the customs laws.
Much of what Customs does will go unchallenged if Customs exercises its discretionary powers in favor of its primary and most
immediate constituency, the ·importers. This is true because many
persons with interests the Service is designed to protect (e.g., consumers) either lack a sufficient interest to challenge Customs actions or lack standing to seek administrative or judicial correction
of erroneous Customs action. The proposals herein would provide
procedures so that such persons could challenge Customs actions.
Many of the recommendations included herein would strengthen
the role of the Customs Court in overseeing substantive and procedural aspects of Customs activity, sometimes by taking review
authority away from the district courts. When this is so, it is because the issues raised require the experience or expertise of the
Customs Court and because of the advantages in having a unified
body of customs law established through a national court.
The question arises whether the Customs Court is qualified for
the task. It is clear that the recommendations made here will be
effective only if· the judges of the Customs Court use new authority
imaginatively and forcefully. Because the quality of appointments
to the court will influence whether the goals underlying the recommendations can be achieved, the process of selecting judges
should be reviewed to ensure that the best possible appointments
are made.
As an institution, the Customs Court seems capable of fulfilling
the role envisioned in this article. The national jurisdiction of the
court assures uniformity of treatment. The court is well funded
and staffed. It has the authority to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents, and may punish persons
for contempt. 206 The rules of the Customs Court were revised and
modernized along the lines of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
soon after passage. of the Customs Court Act of 1970, 207 and now
205

For the view that administrative law should reflect he fact that agencies mediate
between various interests see Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
88 HARV. L. REV. 1671 (1975).
206
See note 165 and accompanying text supra.
207 Pub. L. No. 91-271, tit. I, 84 Stat. 274 (1970) (codified in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
disput~s
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provide for full discovery and motion procedures. The Act
strengthened the Customs Court as an institution by enabling the
court to reduce its substantial backlog of cases. 208 These reforms
not only streamlined Customs Court procedure, but ]eft the resources of the court relatively underutilized. Indeed, one of the
attractive features of relying on the Customs Court for more judicial control over Customs action is that the court appears able to
take on new responsibilities without requiring significant additional
resources. This conclusion is supported by the available statistics 209
and by the fact that some Customs Court judges frequently sit on
federal district courts.
If there is a drawback in relying upon the Customs Court for
strengthened review of Customs action, it is that the Customs
Court sits primarily in New York City, while district courts are
more accessible to other ports. Litigants at ports other than New
York presumably would prefer to challenge Customs actions in
their local district courts. However, this drawback can be overcome.
The Customs Court can use its authority to hear cases at places
other than New York. 210 Some judges of the court might sit permanently in locations outside of New York-particularly on the
West Cost, where customs work has grown mo~t rapidly in recent
years. 211 Finally, the court might experiment with using long dis""" Jd. The Act consolidated into one trial issues previously raised in separate consecutive
trials (one on valuation and a second on classification of merchandise). In addition, the Act
reduced Customs Court congestion by allowing the Service to revise appraisements while a
suit is pending in court, by reducing from three to one the number of judges assigned to
hear cases, by dropping the rule that all protests denied by Customs be referred automatically to the Custorris Court, and by lengthening the time within which a denied protest could
be appealed, thus decreasing the number of cases appealed by importers merely to preserve
the possibility of appeal. See H.R. REP. No. 1067, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1970).
209
The statistical information available is difficult to appraise because it does not necessarily reflect factors such as the time spent at trial or difficulty of the issues. Over 23,000
"cases" were terminated during fiscal year 1976, but many were disposed of collectively by
trying a single test case. In fact, only 64 cases were tried that year (an average of seven per
judge), while an additional 869 cases were disposed of on the basis of stipulations or
dispositive orders. Seventy-three written decisions were published, and 721 decisions were
made with only short abstracts summarizing the subject matter. See U.S. Customs Court,
Report for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1976 (1976) (available from the U.S. Customs
Court, New York, N.Y.). These figures are consistent with statisics concerning the workload
of the court in prior years. Of course, these figures-which seem to indicate that the court
has substantial unused judicial resources-do not necessarily reflect the time spent in the
trial or decision of cases or the time spent on deciding nondispositive motions.
210
28 u.s.c. § 256 (1970).
211 Between 1970 and 1975 the total value of foreign trade from West Coast portsincluding both imports and exports-rose 160 percent. For ports in California alone, foreign
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tance video communications in emergency situations so that litigants can present arguments to the court without appearing in New
York in person.
Jurisdiction and Powers of the Customs Court

1. Customs Court Jurisdiction Without a Protest or Petition
Congress should amend 28 U.S.C. § 1582 to broaden the jurisdiction of
the Customs Court by giving the court exclusive jurisdiction of any civil
action brought to challenge final agency action (as defined in the Administrative Procedure Act) of the Customs Service. Two types of actions should
be excepted from this jurisdiction: those specifically subject to review in
another court, and those pertaining to the exclusion of merchandise under a
law that is not a customs law taken by the Customs Service on the request or
at the direction of anotherfederal agency.
Because under present law a protest by an importer or a petition
by a U.S. manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler must be filed
and denied before the Customs Court has jurisdiction, the administrative process at Customs is insulated from challenge in
the Customs Court until the protest or petition process has run its
course. Neither Customs action nor inaction can be reviewed or
controlled by the Customs Court except through those procedures.212
This system has three adverse effects. First, it unduly limits the
subject matter jurisdiction of the Customs Court, because final
Customs action that is not subject to a protest or petition under 19
U .S.C. § 1514 (1970) is neyer reviewed in the Customs Court. 213
trade increased 20 percent in the first 10 months of 1976, with imports increasing more than
28 percent. Wall St.]., Jan. 20, 1977, at 1, col. 5.
212 See text accompanying notes ll2-34 supra.
213 There are many examples. Refusal to license a broker is not subject to either protest or
petition or to any other articulated procedure leading to judicial review (although revocation
or suspension of a broker's license is subject to judicial review). Suspension of immediate
delivery privileges as well as the amount required to be filed as a bond are not subject to
protest or petition and therefore are not subject to review in the Customs Court. It has been
suggested that an importer required to file an unduly large bond might refuse to file the
bond and then protest the subsequent exclusion of his merchandise (which would follow if
no bond were filed). However, this is an uncertain and circuitous remedy. One seeking
review concerning the amount of a bond should not be forced to give up control of his
merchandise in order to challenge the decision.
It is not possible or desirable to list all of the Customs actions which are final and which
would be subject to review in the Customs Court under this recommendation. The purpose
of the recommendation is to give the Customs Court general jurisdiction to ensure that a
forum is always available to review final decisions of the Customs Service.
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Although such actions might be reviewed in a district court, 214
challenges there are inadequate. There is no certainty that the
district court wiH take jurisdiction; it may not if it concludes that
the action is within the exdusive jurisdiction of the Customs Court
or that Congress intended the action to be nonreviewable. 215
Uncertainty concerning the availability of judicial review is in itself
sufficient reason to provide for :review of all final actions of the
Service. Moreover, even assuming that the district court would take
jurisdiction, Customs Court review would be preferable, since the
judges of the Custows Court are more familiar with Customs
procedures and terminology and have a level of expertise not
possessed by the district court bench. This recommendation would
therefore expand the subject matter jurisdiction of the Customs
Court to include review of aH final actions of the Customs Service,
and would make such jurisdic.tion exclusive.
The recommendation would also dispel confusion concerning
review of actions resulting in exclusion of merchandise. Presently,
exclusion of merchandise under a law that is not a customs law is
not subject to a protest or to review in the Customs Court, even if it
is Customs that decides that the merchandise is prohibited o:r
restricted. Instead, review is in a district court, aithough district
courts have no sp~cial expertise or experience which favors them as
a reviewing forum in those cases. Review of Customs exclusion
decisions should be in the Customs Court so that substantive and
procedural aspects of all such decisions are uniformly adjudicated.216
A second adverse effect of the limitations on Customs Court
jurisdiction is that the Customs Court is not authorized to review
Customs inaction-that is, failure or refusal of Customs to act when
it should. Normally, the failure of an agency to act when it should
is considered "agency action" which may be final for purposes of
judicial review. 217 But unlawful inaction at the Customs Service
ZH See, e.g., Gallagher and Ascher Co. v. Simon, No.76C-3499 (N.D. 111. Oct. 12, 1976)
(granting temporary restraining order against withdrawal of immediate release privileges).
"'' See notes 189-90 supra and accompanying text. Sre, e.g., J.C. Penney Co. v. United
States Treasury Dep't, supra note 187, at 98.
216
!-io1.vever, the recommendation would not authorize the Customs Court to review
exclusion cases for which the court has no special expertise or experience. Obscenity cases,
for example, would continue to be brought in district courts. The portion of the recommendation governing which exclusion cases will be reviewed in the Customs Court is discussed in
more detail below.
217
5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1970). See, e.g., Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856,
862 (4th Cir. 1961).

1154

[Vol. 9:1101

JUDICIAL REVIEW

generally is not subject to protest or petition and therefore is not
subject to review in the· Customs Court. 218
A significant instance of inaction is refusal or failure of the
Service to proceed with liquidation when it otherwise could and
should. Because Customs is not required to complete liquidation
within any period of time, the courts afford the sole remedy when
a liquidation (or other action) is unjustifiably delayed. Yet present
jurisdictional limitations preclude the court from deciding whether
such inaction is unlawful. Two recent cases challenging delay in
completing liquidation iBustrate the problem. 219 In both cases the
Customs Court was found to lack jurisdiction since liquidation had
not taken place, and therefore, no protest had been filed and
denied. This result should be changed.
Judicial review is not the only way of controlling unlawful delay
in agency action. Legislation before the House of Representatives,
for example, would impose time limits on liquidation decisions. 220
The recommendation here would not preclude such procedural
improvements; nor would it be rendered obsolete by them. Judicial
review of agency inaction is an important control on the
discretionary functions of administrative agencies and should be
available with respect to the Customs Service. The Administrative
Procedure Act requires a reviewing court to "compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed," 221 a general
standard to which the Customs Service should be held. 222
218 One particularly striking example of erroneous, but unreviewable, Customs inaction is
provided by United States v. Astra BentWood Furniture Co., 28 C.C.P.A. 205 (1940). There the
importer was denied Customs Court jurisdiction to challenge the assessment of duties
because no notice of liquidation had been posted (though plaintiff had received one).
Customs' failure to post a notice of liquidation was held not subject to a protest and thus not
subject to challenge in the Customs CGurt.
219 United States v. Boe, 543 F.2d 151 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (under All Writs Act, Chief Judge
of Customs Court ordered not to take jurisdiction over case before a protest has been filed
and denied); Dexter v. United States, 11 CusT. BuLL. 50 (Cust. Ct. Feb. 9, 1977) (Customs
Court has no jurisdiction under the All Writs Act to consider whether liquidation is unreasonably withheld).
220 Under the legislation,, merchandise not liquidated within! year of entry or withdrawal
from a warehouse is deemed liquidated at the amount of duties paid at the time of entry or
withdrawal, unless the time is extended to obtain additional information or liquidation is
suspended pursuant to statute or court order. H.R. 8149, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 218 (1977).
221
5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
222
At least one district court has taken jurisdiction and ordered Customs to proceed with
appraisement. In Alto Plastics Mfg. Co. v. Hann, No. 70-2056-JWG (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 1971),
the district court found that Customs had "unreasonably delayed appraisement" and ordered that appraisement be completed, basing jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970). The
fact that district courts might be available to provide relief in such instances does not detract
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Limited Customs Court jurisdiction produces a third adverse
effect-inability of the system to afford protection against
irreparable injury in the customs context. As George Bronz, a
former leader of the customs bar, has said:
If Customs officers exclude merchandise from entry or
delivery, the importer cannot always wait four months for
administrative reconsideration, plus an even longer period
for a full-scale trial and decision by the Customs Court.
An importer with an unresolved duty issue can assume the
financial risk, and continue his imports. An importer
whose product is refused entry must suspend his business
until the conclusion of judicial proceedings. Apart from
the expense of warehousing in bond, the merchandise
may be perishable, or, when quotas are involved, the
quota period may run out. Today, the importer has no
:real access to judicial review in such cases. 223

The recommendation here would permit the Customs Court to
provide timely relief if exclusion (or other Customs action)
threatens irreparable injury where the normal protest process has
not been completed.
Basing Customs Court jurisdiction on the denial of a protest or
petition is consistent with the general principle that administrative
remedies should be exhausted before action is subject to review. In
most routine cases involving review of duty assessments this
premise is appropriate since importers are guaranteed a refund if
they have overpaid estimated duties, and there is generally little
harm in delay. The exhaustion principle thus avoids disruption of
the administrative process. However, there are recognized
exceptions and qualifications to that principle which permit courts
from the importance of the recommendation. here. The remedy in a district court is
uncertain; district court might hold that the matter is within the exclusive (but unobtainable)
jurisdiction of the Customs Court. See notes 189-90 supra.
3
"
Hearings on S. 2624 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in judicial Machinery of the Senate
Cmmn. on the judiciary, 9Jst Cong., ]st Sess. 205 (1969) (statement of George Bronz). See also
address by George Branz, Second judicial Conference of the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (May 29, 1975), reprinted in 69 F.R.D. ll 9, 18!-88 ( 1976). The
American Bar Association, without recommending an expansion in the jurisdiction of the
Customs Court, has recommended that Congress authorize the court to "assume jurisdiction
prior to the otherwise required exhaustion of all administrative remedies to prevent irreparable injury." That principle is incorporated in legislation now before the Senate. S. 1430,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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to reVIew agency action before all administrative remedies have
been exhausted, 224 particularly when the administrative remedy is
inadequate because it fails to offer relief commensurate with the .
plaintiffs claim 225 or to protect against irreparable injury. 226 The
recommendation here, by adopting the more flexible concept of
final agency action from the Administrative Procedure Act, 227
incorporates these considerations.
The deficiencies in Customs Court review that result from the
jurisdictional prereqms1te of · a denied protest or petition-limitations on subject matter jurisdiction, ·inability to
review Customs inaction, and inability to protect against
irreparable injury-operate with respect to all of the Customs
functions described in this article, as well as to other Customs
actions for which there is no judicial review. The recommendation
would correct. these deficiencies by giving the Customs Court
authority to review Customs action outside of the normal
procedure, while preserving the protest and petition procedures
for those cases to which they are applicable. The question of
standing to challenge final agency actions which are subject to
review is addressed separately below.
Two types of cases would be exempted ·from the ex.panded
jurisdiction of the Customs Court. The first, cases specifically
subject to review in another court, includes several types of
administrative action not reviewable in the Customs Court: actions
under the Freedom of Information Act (now subject to review in a
district court); actions involving personnel (now subject to review in
the Court of Claims); and actions revoking or suspending a
broker's license (now subject to review in a court of appeals). This
proviso, particularly as it pertains to the revocation or suspension
of brokers' licenses, was not based upon a decision that present
224 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES 446 (1976); B. ScHWAR'IZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 173 (1976). See Fuchs, Prerequisites to Judicial Review of Administrative
Agency Action, 51 IND. L.J. 817, 859 (1976).
225 The phrase is that of Professor Jaffe. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE
AcTION 426 (1965), citing Skinner and Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249 U.S. 557 (1919) (to
attack ICC authorization of railroad rates without a hearing it is not necessary to seek
remedy in administrative proceedings) arul R.A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 299 F.2d 127 (D.C.
Cir. 1962) (to attack order requiring petition for exemption from securities registration
requirements it is not necessary to first seek such an exemption).
226 See, e.g., Utah Fuel Co. v. Nat'! Bituminous Coal Comm., 306 U.S. 56 (1939) (in q:mrse
of proceeding, agency proposes to reveal a document claimed to contain confidential information).
227 Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856, 865-66 (4th Cir. 1961).
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judicial review procedures are adequate. More adequate review
might be had in the Customs Court or the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, particularly of revocation or suspension of brokers'
licenses. Contemplation of such a change, however, would require
a much more thorough review of the subject than the scope of this
article would allow.
The second exemption is more complicated. Under present law,
decisions to exdude merchandise may be made by the Customs
Service, the President, the International Trade Commission, or one
..f
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plemented by the Customs Service. For purposes of review,
present law distinguishes between exclusion under a customs law
and exclusion under other laws. If exclusion is pursuant to a
customs law, :review is obtained by filing a protest and appealing
denial of the protest to the Customs Court, rather than to a district
court. This is true whether the exclusion decision is made by the
Customs Service (e.g., by interpreting the statute requiring
country-of-origin marking) or by the President (e.g., by imposing a
quota). Where exclusion is under a law that is not a customs law, no
protest may be filed and therefore the Customs Court has no
jurisdiction, even if the exclusion decision is made by the Customs
Service (e.g., under the law ba:r:rir1g switchblade knives) rather than
by another agency.
The recommendation and the second exemption would change
this scheme in only one respect. As previously mentioned, each
exclusion decision made by the Customs Service would be subject
to review in the Customs Court rather than in a district court,
whether taken pursuant to a customs law or a law that is not a
customs law. The recommendation would not change the forum
for review in other exclusion cases. Exclusion decisions by the
President or another agency under a customs law would continue
to be subject to protest and review in the Customs Court. This is
desirabie because such cases raise trade policy issues which the
Customs Court is well suited to hear. Exclusion decisions by other
agencies or by a court pursuant to a law that is not a customs law
would be subject to review in the forum in which they are presently
reviewed. 228 These cases generally :raise issues for which the
Customs Court has no expertise and which usually are decided by
"" Thus, obscenity cases under 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1970) would continue to be brought in
district courts rather than the Customs Court.
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the district court when the law is applied to domestic goods.
Consequently, there would be no advantage and some disadvantages to transferring jurisdiction over such cases to the
Customs Court. 229
2. Power to Enjoin or Compel Actions
Congress should amend 28 U.S.C. § 1581 to confer upon the Customs
Court the remedial powers of a district court in respect of actions properly
pending before it.

This recommendation is a corollary to the preceding reccommendation expanding the jurisdiction of the Customs Court.
Both the Customs Court and the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals have taken a narrow view of the powers of the Customs
Court. Decisions refer to the lack of "equity power" of the court
and raise doubts about the ability of the court to provide effective
relief in appropriate cir.cumstances under the All Writs Act or the
Declaratory Judgment Act. 230 To the extent that such decisions are
premised on the fact that the court may provide no relief until the
protest or petition procedure has been completed, they would be
modified by the previous recommendation. To the extent that such
decisions indicate that the judicial power of the court is inferior to
that of other courts, they would be changed by this recommendation. To the extent that such decisions reflect a judgment on the
merits concerning the claim before the court, they would not be
modified.
The proposed change is necessary to ensure that the Customs
Court can provide timely and effective relief by, for example,
"compel[ling] agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed;" 231 "postpon[ing] the effective date of agency action or
preserv[ing] the status or rights" of persons pending appeal; 232
issuing writs in aid of its jurisdiction; 233 or declaring the rights and
other legal relations of· parties before it in any case of actual
controversy within its jurisdiction. 234 The recommendation is expressed broadly so that the court may not disclaim the authority to
229 This Article does not address the adequacy of judicial review of exclusion decisions
made by agencies other than the Customs Service.
230 See notes 169-79 supra and accompanying text.
231
5 u.s.c. § 706(1) (1970).
232
Jd: § 705.
233 28 U.S.C. § 165l(a) (1970).
234
ld. § 2201.
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grant proper relief in appropriate cases. hs language is adopted
from a proposal of the American Bar Association which has been
incorporated in legislation introduced by Senator DeConcini. 235

3. Political Affiliation of Court Appointees and Selection of the C!n:ef
Judge
Congress should amend 28 U.S.C. § 251 to delete the requirement that
not more than five of the nine Judges of the Customs Court be appointed
from the same political . party and to provide that the chiif judge be
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.

The Customs Court is unique among Article III courts in the
selection of its judges and chief judge. Section 251 of Title 28 of
the U.S. Code requires that not more than five of the nine judges
of the Customs Court be appointed from the same political party
and that the chief judge be. selected by the President. Both requirements were originally enacted when the Board of General
Appraisers (the precursor of the Customs Court) was established in
1890 as a quasi-administrative, quasi-judicial body to review
classification and valuation of imports. 236 The Board of General
A
•
1
1
•
•
l ooaT~
r'J<:J7
n..ppralsers
evotvea
mto
a JUOicia
ana m 1 ::~zo was renamed the Customs Court, but the provisions concerning the political affiliation of its judges and the appointment of a chief judge
were never changed. They are outdated, unnecessary, and inconsistent with the notion of an impartial judiciary.
1"
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1

11

•

...,.

J""'.n..f""

235
S. 1430, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See 123 CoNG. REc. S6787 (daily ed. Apr. 29,
1977). Similar legislation was introduced in the previous session of Congress by Senator
Hruska. S. 3871, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1976). See 122 CoNG. REc. S17,121 (daily ed. Sept.
29, 1976).
236
Customs Administrative Act of june 10, 1890, ch. 407, § 12, 26 Stat. 131 (1890)
(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 251 (1970)). See generally W. FuTRELL, THE HISTORY or
AMERICAN CUSTOMS juRISPRUDENCE 136-37 (1941); R. SMITH, CUSTOMS VALUATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 131 (1948).
237
The evolution of u~e Board of Genera! ..A... ppraisers from an administrative-judiciai
body to a judicial body was recognized in Stone v. Whitridge, 129 F. 33 (4th Cir. 1904), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. United States v. Whitridge, 197 U.S. 135 (1905) ("the Board is an
independent tribunal, empowered by law to pass upon certain controversies between the
Government and the importer, and in this respect the Board is no more subordinate to the
Treasury Department than is any other Court"). Thereafter, in the Payne-Aldrich Tariff
Act, ch. 6, § 28, 'if !2, 36 Stat. ll (1909) (repealed 1913), Congress gave the Board "ali the
powers of a circuit court of the United States;" in the Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 518, 42
Stat. 972 (1922), the Board was given all the powers of a district court to preserve order,
compel attendance of witnesses and production of evidence, and punish for contempt; and
in the Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 518, 46 Stat. 737 (1930) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
252 (1970)), the judges of the Customs Court were given life tenure, subject to good
behavior, thus rendering them immune to executive removal.
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It is recommended that the language concerning the political
affiliation of court appointees be deleted by Congress. 238 The appointment of a chief judge should follow one of the methods used
with respect to other courts. The chief judges of the. Court of
Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals are appointed by the President, with the .advice and consent of the Senate, and hold office for their judicial tenure. 239 In the courts of
appeals and district courts, the chief judge is a judge in regular
service "who is senior in commission and under seventy years of
age."24o
Because of the significant responsibilities and authority of the
chief judge, it is proposed that the chief judge of the Customs
Court, like the chief judge of the other national courts, be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
The chief judge of the Customs Court supervises administration of
the court; 241 promulgates the dockets, designates the judge or (in
three-judge cases) judges to try cases, and reassigns them "when
circumstances so warrant;" 242 decides when three-judge courts are
appropriate, 243 and assigns judges to hear cases at other ports or in
foreign countries. 244 These responsibilities make it desirable that
the selection of the chief judge be made with a view to his administrative abilities, which is only possible if the chief judge is an
appointee. 245
Standing to Seek Administrative and judicial Review
Congress should amend 19 U.S. C. § 1516 to allow any person adversely
affected by an incorrect determination of the appraised value or classifica238
This recommendation is now before Congress inS. 1430, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977),
following a similar recommendation of the American Bar Association.
230 28 U .S.C. § 171 ( 1970) (Court of Claims); id. § 211 (Court of Customs and Patent.
Appeals).
240
28 U.S.C. § 45 (1970) (courts of appeals); id. § 136 (district courts).
241
28 U.S.C. § 253(a) (1970).
242
Id. § 255(b)-(c). Three-judge courts are provided whenever the action "(I) raises an
issue of the constitutionality of an Act of Congress, a proclamation of the President or an
Executive order; or (2) has broad or significant implications in the administration or interpretation of the Customs laws." Id. § 255(a).
w 28 u.s.c. § 255 (1970).
244
ld. § 256.
245
This proposal is similar to one under consideration by the Department of Justice. The
Department's proposal, however, would require the d1ief judge selected by the President to
step down as chief judge when he reached the age of 70.
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tion of, or rate of duty assessed upon, imported merchandise to obtain from
the Customs Service irifonnation concerning such decision and to petition for
a change. Denials of such petitions should be reviewable in the Customs
Court.
Congress should enact a new statutory provision giving any person
adversely affected by an action of the Customs Service concerning merchandise that is (or should be) excluded from enlly or delivery, a means of
seeking administrative review of such action. Subsequent review in the
Customs Court should be provided. However, such a procedure should not
be available to challenge action excluding merchandise upon request or
order addressed to the Customs Service by a court or another federal agency
taken under a law that is not a customs law.
If Congress broadens the jurisdiction of the Customs Court as recommended above it should also provide that actions within the bmadened
jurisdiction may be brought by any adversely affected person who has
exhausted his administrative remedies.

Public participation in the administrative process has been called
one of the "cornerstones for contemporary administrative law and
for the future." 246 But public participation has not been a noticeable part of the administrative process at the Customs Service. This
is unfortunate. The Customs Service makes decisions that affect
many interests, including those of importers, competing U.S. companies, foreign suppliers and exporters, and purchasers of imported merchandise. VJhen those interests are adversely affected,
Customs' action should be subject to challenge through administrative procedures and judicial review. These recommendations
would revise the laws which preclude such challenges. 247
Presently, the only formal means of seeking administrative review of decisions made by the Customs Service is to file a protest or
petition. Protests may be filed only by the importer or consignee of

'·'H

Williams, Securing Fairness and Regularity in J!dminisl.ral.ivc Proceedings, 29 AD. L. REV. 1,

J 5 (J 977).

"·" The Customs Service has procedures to provide "interested parties" with an administrative ruling setting forth "a definitive interpretation of applicable law, or other appropriate
information." 19 C.F.R. § 177 .I ( 1977); see text accompanying notes 71-73 supra. This
procedure is not a substitute for the right to challenge Customs action, however, and is often
inadequate because of delays in issuing rulings. The rulings are only given to persons "with a
direct and demonstrable interest in the question or questions presented;" they are issued
only with respect to prospective transactions to a person who submits all relevant .facts; and
they are not subject to re\~ew until after they are applied to particular transactions. ! 9 C.F.R.
§ J 77 (J 977). As a result, rulings are of little value to a person not directly involved in the
transaction for which the ruling is sought.
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the merchandise subject to the protestetl' Customs action, by their
agents, 248 or by a person to whom merchandise placed in a bonded
warehouse has been tran:sferred. 249 A petition may be filed only by
a U.S. manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler of the same class or
kind of merchandise as that affected by the Customs action challenged. Moreover, the petition procedures allow challenges to only
three types of action: (1) decisions concerning the classification or
appraised value of, or rate of duty on, merchandise; (2) decisions
not to impose countervailing or antidumping duties; and (3) determinations that merchandise is not being, or is not likely to be,
sold at less than fair value under the Antidumping Act of 1921, or
has not received a bounty or grant under the Countervailing Duty
Act. U.S. manufacturers, producers, and wholesalers seeking to
challenge Customs actions concerning a class of merchandise in
which they do not deal, and other persons wishing to challenge
Customs action through the administrative process, have no means
of doing so.
_
Similar limitations restrict standing to seek judicial review of
Customs actions. The Customs Court has no jurisdiction to review
Customs action unless a protest or petition has been denied by
Customs. District courts may take jurisdiction over Customs actions
that are not in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Customs Court, 250
but the Customs Court, because of its expertise and continuing
control of Customs actions, would provide a better forum for
review. Moreover, district courts have no jurisdiction over actions
subject to a protest or petition procedure (since review of such
actions is exclusively in the Customs Court) even if the plaintiff is
not authorized to file a protest or petition. 251 In short, many persons who may be adversely .affected by decisions of the Customs
Service have no effective means of challenging those decisions at
either the administrative or the judicial level. These recommendations would provide such means.
248

19 U .S.C. § 1514 (1970).
ld. § 1557(b).
250
See, e.g., Tim ken Co. v. Simon, 539 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. I 976) (suit to challenge failure
to withhold appraisement under the Antidumping Act).
251
See, e.g., Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Comm. for the Implementation of Textile Agreements, No. 76-1064 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 20, 1977), petition for rehearing
denied (D.C. Cir. Sept. 2, 1977)(discussed in text accompanying notes 253-55 infra); Kocher
v. Fowler, 397 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 920 (1968) (discussed in note
257 infra).
249
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To understand the impact of these proposals, one should consider the effect they would have on those who may be adversely
affected by Customs actions-U.S. manufacturers, producers, and
wholesalers, competing importers, foreign suppliers, and consumers. U.S. companies whose products compete with imported merchandise have an important stake in decisions made by the Customs Service. Indeed, many of the laws administered by Customs
were enacted to protect such firms. But a U.S. manufacturer,
pr()ducer, or wholesaler may. challenge Customs actions under the
petition provisions of section 516 only if he deals in the same class
or kind of merchandise as that to which the challenged action
pertains. As a result, .a cattle producer may not challenge duty
assessments on imported hides or leather goods (a different class or
kind of merchandise), even if his sales to producers of hides suffer
because imports are facilitated. by erroneous Customs action. Similarly, a manufacturer of steel may not challenge duty assessments
on auto bodies even if he is injured when Customs fails to collect
the proper duties. 252
The recommendation would amend section 516 so that any adversely affected person could challenge decisions on classification,
rates of duty, and appraisement.
The types of decisions U.S. companies may challenge formally
also are restricted. The procedures undersection 516 do not provide for challenges to the admission of merchandise or to ·the
procedures Customs employs to inspect, assess, weigh, or otherwise
process merchandise. Yet those actions, if erroneous or inadequate,
could adversely affect U.S. businesses which Congress intended to
protect through many of the trade laws.
This proposal also would authorize standing for persons who
buy merchandise from importers: manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, and consumers. Such persons are not authorized to file a
protest or petition or otherwise challenge Customs action, d~spite
the fact that they may be injured by the actions-for example,
decisions concerning duties directly affect the price of merchandise, and decisions to exclude merchandise directly affect both
availability and price. Normally, interests of these persons are pro252
No case has been found which directly raises this issue, but the statute seems fairly
clear on this point. The term "class or kind" of merchandise is not defined in section 516 or
any other provision of the customs laws, although it is used in other provisions. E.g., 19
U.S.C. § 160 (Supp. V 1975).
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tected by importers (who are affected most directly by the decisions). However, importers may have neither resources nor incentive to challenge erroneous Customs action,. especially if they can ·
pass price increases on to their customers or otherwise avoid the
impact of the decisions. Thus, customers of importers may be left
without a remedy against erroneous Customs, action.
In Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Comm. for the
Implementation of Textile Agreements, 253 for example, Consumers
Union brought suit in a district court to challenge t~xtile quotas
imposed by the President under Section 204 of the Agricultural
Act of 1956. After questioning the plaintiffs standing to sue in
federal court, 254 the Court of Appeals directed dismissal of the case
because the subject matter--exclusion of merchandise under a. customs law 255-was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Customs
Court. Howeve;, the Customs Court may not ;be able to hear the
case. If Consumers Union itself does not import the ·textiles subject
to a quota, it may not file a protest against the exclusion of the
textiles, and therefore, may not seek review of the exclusion in the
Customs Court. Under these circumstances, there may be no court
available to adjudicate the claim made by Consumers Union.
Foreign suppliers also have an important stake in decisions made
by the Customs Se~ice, but have no means of challenging such
decisions. Customs decisions to increase duties or exclude merchandise may cost them outlets for their merchandise by causing
importers to switch suppliers. If this occurs, there is no sound
253
No. 76-1064 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 20, 1977),petitionfor rehearing denied (D.C.. Cir. Sept. 20,
1977).
254 The Court of Appeals intimated that plaintiffs interest in the matter was too indirect
and not within the relevant ''zone of interest" since plaintiffs purchases of textiles were for
testing purposes rather than consumer use. !d. slip op. at 6.
255 This is the first case holding that merchandise excluded under a quota imposed by the
President is excluded under the provisions of a customs law. A case cited by the court, W.
Dairy Products, Inc. v. United States, 373 F. Supp. 568 (Cust. Ct. 1974),a.fj'd, 510 F.2d 376
(C.C.P.A. 1975), involved review of a classification decision that triggered a licensing restriction imposed by the President, but not re'!iew of the licensing restriction itself. Compa'fe
Massachusetts v. Simon, No. 75-0192 (D.D.C. Feb. 21, 1975), rev'd sub nom., Algonquin SNG,
Inc. v. Federal Energy Administration, 518 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U~S. 548
(1976) (reviewing license fees imposed by President on imported oil and petroleum products) with cases cited in note 186 supra. The Customs Court has traditionally ~;eviewed
Presidential action that results in increased duties. United States v. Best Foods, Inc., 47
C.C.P.A. 163 (1960) (fee imposed on peanuts); United States v. Schmidt Pritchard & Co., 47
C.C.P.A. 152, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 919 (1960) (Presidential proclamation under the escape
clause); Star Indus., Inc. v. United States, 462 F.2d 557 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076
(1972) (Presidential proclamation suspending certain trade agreement concessions).
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reason for prohibiting foreign suppliers from challenging the action. Foreign suppliers are an important source of competition and
provide consumers with many products which could not otherwise
be obtained. When Customs is erroneously protectionist, these
companies should not be barred from protecting their own and
their customers' interests.
The most controversial aspect of this recommendation is that it
would enable importers to challenge Customs decisions made with
respect to the merchandise of competing importers. Under present
law, only the importer or consignee of merchandise may protest
decisions concerning that merchandise. Other importers may not,
and therefore may not seek review in the Customs Court. Moreover, since such decisions are within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Customs Court, 256 district .courts do not have jurisdiction to
review them. But an importer may be i~ured by Customs decisions
concerning the merchandise of his competitor. The adversely affected importer, like the adversely affected domestic competitor,
should be afforded an opportunity to challenge the decision.
There have been two principal objections to this proposal. The
first is that there is neither pressing need nor demonstrable support for it. Importers, it is claimed, have other means of protecting
their interests. If Customs mal~ces a decision that favors one importer over another importing the same merchandise, the second
importer usually can protect his interest by seeking (through the
protest procedure) to have his merchandise treated in the same
manner. However, this is not always true. Customs may appraise
one importer's merchandise at the correct value, but appraise that
of another at an incorrectly low value; the first importer could
neither successfully challenge the correct appraisement of its own
merchandise nor eliminate the advantage given its competitor by
the erroneous decision. The same situation can arise if the two
companies import different, but nonetheless competing, merchandise (e.g., copper and aluminum). 257
256
See, e.g., Kocher v. Fowler, 397 F.2d 641, 642-43 (D.C. Cir: 1 967), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
920 (1968).
257
See, e.g., id. There Customs decided to permit duty-free treatment for watch ITJOVements imported from the Virgin Islands. T.D. 54,821(2), 94 TREAS. DEc. 154 (1959).
Appellant was an importer of Swiss watches who claimed "injury in his business relations" as
a result of this allegedly unlawful interpretation of the statute. 397 F.2d at 642. Yet
plaintiffs suit was dismissed because exclusive jurisdiction over the matter (the assessment of
duties) was in the Customs Court. Plaintiff, who could not sue in the Customs Court, was
denied any effective remedy.
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The second objection raised to this proposal is that the procedures could be used to harass competitors or seek confidential
business information. Importers, in particular, are concerned that
competitors might seek the names of foreign suppliers or information concerning prices or costs-information which is asserted to be
of commercial value. 258
·
A partial response to these concerns is that for 50 years U.S.
manufacturers, producers, and wholesalers have beeri authorized
to challenge Customs duty assessments, 259 but there is no evidence
that such procedures have been misused. Although importers may
have more incentive than U.S. manufacturers, producers, or
wholesalers to learn the sources and commercial practices of their
importing rivals, the apparent lack of abuse of existing procedures
suggests that concerns about the disclosure of confidential information may be exaggerated.
More importantly, procedures already adopted by the Customs
Service and the Customs Court to protect information that is
legitimately confidential reduce the likelihood that the standing
procedures recommended here would be abused. Customs will not
disclose to any person "information pertaining to trade secrets,
business operations, and commercial or financial information of
importers, exporters, and other persons who transact Customs
business." 260 SpecificaJly:
Information contained in invoices, entries, vessel manifests, export declarations, official reports of investigating
officers, records pertaining. to the licensing of and the
revocation or suspension of a license of a customhouse
broker, and other papers or documents filed with Customs
officers for any official purpose which contain trade secrets, or commercial or financial information, is exempt
from disclosure except for the purpose for which such
documents are required to be filed. 261
25 '. Similar concerns have been raised with respect to the disclosure of confidential business information under the Freedom of Information Act. For a comparison, see Patten and
Weinstein, Disclosure of Business Secrets under the Freedom of Information Act: Suggested Limitations, 29 An. L. REv.l93 (1977).
259
Act of September 21, 1922, ch. 356, tit. IV,§ 516, 42 Stat. 970 (current version at 19
u.s.c. § 1516(b) (1970)).
260
·1 9 C.F.R. § 103.!0(c) (I 977). This Freedom of Information Act rule is also applied to
requests for information filed by a U.S. manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler under
section 516. Id. § 175.2l(b).
·
26
' 19 C.F.R. § 103.1p(d)(l) (1977).
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Moreover, confidential information developed in connection v1~th
an investigation under the Antidumping Act of 1921 is exempt
from disclosure 262 and criminal penalties may be imposed for the
unauthorized release of confidential information by government
employees. 263 The Customs Court will also protect the confidentiality of information. The statute which would be amended
pursuant to these recommendations provides that "in an action
instituted by an American manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler,
the plaintiff may not inspect any documents or papers of a consignee or importer disclosing any information which the Customs
Court deems unnecessary or improper to be disclosed." 264 This has
been applied in cases brought by U.S. manufacturers, producers,
and wholesalers wherein the Customs Court has issued protective
orders restricting information developed through discovery to attorneys and experts for the parties. 265 These procedures decrease
the likelihood that broadening standing to challenge Customs action would result in disclosure of confidential information.
The recommendation made here does not specifically identify
the persons who could challenge Customs actions. Rather, it adopts
the general standard of the Administrative Procedure Act that
persons adversely affected by an administrative action may challenge that action. 266 In many instances, the firms discussed above
would be considered adversely affected because they would be
within the "zone of interests" 267 protected by the statutes enforced
by Customs and would be injured in fact. 268 The ultimate determination of standing would be a judicial decision. This recommendation is intended to lower the procedural barriers that now prevent
the operation of that judicial process.
Persons adversely affected by actions now subject to challenge
'"' 19 U .S.C. § 160(d)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
'"' 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970).
'"·' 28 U .S.C. § 2637 (1970).
265
CusT. CT. R. 6.l(c). See, e.g., A.S.G. Indus., Inc. v. United States, No. 76-3-00667
(Cust. Ct. May I 0, 1977) (order granting defendant's motion for protective order).
2 6
"
5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
267
See Ass'n of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, !53 ( 1970).
200
See aiso Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970) (farmers eligible for government
payments have standing to challenge validity of regulation expanding circumstances in
which payments may be assigned); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 ( 1970) (regulations concerning national banks may be challenged by nonregulated competitors); United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (I 973) (general
member of public has standing if he alleges "that he has been or will in fact be perceptibly
harmed by the challenged agency action").
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under section 516 would use the administrative procedures already
available. For those adversely affected by action excluding or admitting merchandise, the recommendation provides both new administrative procedures to challenge that action and subsequent
judicial review. For those affected by any other final agency action,
the recommendations of this Article permit suit in the. Customs
Court once administrative remedies are exhausted. These proposals do not attempt to articulate what those remedies would be, but
instead would permit the Customs Service to design the administrative remedy most appropriate in the context of the action subject
to challenge.
Burden of Proof in the Customs Court
Congress should amend 28 U.S.C. § 2635(a) to revise the Customs
Court's standard oj- review in the following way: The presumption of
correctness of Customs Service decisions, and th~ imposition upon the party
challenging a decision of the burden of proving otherwise would be retained. However, the additional requirement (read into the statute by the
Customs Court and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals) that the
challenging party prove not only that the Customs Service was wrong; but
also what a correct decision would be, would be eliminated.
Specifically, the amended statute should provide that, if the Customs
Court determines that action taken by the Customs Service is erroneous, the
court will modify or set aside such action; if the court is able to determine
what action is correct, it should so determine and order that the correct
action be taken; if the court cannot determine what action is correct, it
should remand the case to the Customs Service with instructions to take
action consistent with the decision of the court. Any redetermination made by
the Customs Service pursuant to a remand should be subject to a new protest
or petition, and any decision by the Customs Court to remand a case should
be ·appealable.

This recommendation is necessary to eliminate an anomaly in
Customs Court judicature that precludes the court from reversing or modifying Customs Service actions found to be erroneous. A
plaintiff challenging Customs action in the Customs Court has a
dual burden of proof: he must first overcome a statutory presumption that the Customs action was correct, and if successful, he
must prove what action would have been correct. Curiously, if the
plaintiff proves only that the action of the Customs Service was
incorrect, the court neither modifies the action nor remands the
1977]
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case to the Customs Service. Rather, the action is permitted to
stand unless the plaintiff also proves what the correct action should
have been. As a result, even after Customs Court review admittedly
incorrect Customs action often remains uncorrected under this
system.
The origins of the dual burden of proof are obscure. The presumption of correctness of Customs actions arises from 28 U.S.C.
§ 2635(a), which provides that in matters before the Customs Court:
"The decision of the Secretary of the Treasury, or his delegate, is
presumed to be correct, and the burden to prove otherwise shall
rest upon the party challenging a decision." Although the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals has cited this provision as authority
for requiring the party chaUenging Customs action to prove the
correct decision as well, 269 in fact the dual burden of proof had
been judicially imposed before this provision was enacted in 1930.
The Tariff Act of 1909 instructed the Board of Genera] Appraisers
(the precursor of the Customs Court) to "proceed by all reasonable
ways and means in [its]power to ascertain, estimate and determine
the dutiable value of the imported merchandise, and in so doing
[to] exercise both judicial and inquisitorial functions." 270 Because
the Act contemplated that the Board would make its own
determination rather than simply review the determination of Customs, the Board assigned the importer the burden of supporting a
final determination. 271 The Board did not alter this procedure
when it became a court of review in 1922.
Several cases illustrate the inequity of placing this dual burden of
proof on the plaintiff. 272 Proof of valuation and classification is too
1 9
Hayes-Sammons Chemical Co. v. United States, 55 C.C.P.A. 69 ( !968); Minkap of
"
California, Inc. v. United States, 55 C.C.P.A. I (!967); United States v. Acme Steel Co., 51
C. C.P.A. 8! ( !964); Kobe Import Co. v. United States, 43 C. C.P.A. 136 ( 1956). Moreover,
although Customs may estimate the amount of duties on the basis of reasonable evidence,
the plaintiff must prove every material issue by a preponderance of the evidence in order to
satisfy his burden. Globemaster Midwest, Inc. v. United States, 337 F. Supp. <165 (Cust. Ct.
1971); Park Ave. Imports v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 528 (Cust. Ct. 1969).
270
Tariff Act of !909, ch. 6, § 28(13), 36 Stat. II (1909).
271
!d. See United States v. Edsen Keith 8c Co., 5 Ct. Cust. App. 82 ( 191'1).
72
'
In Dana Perfumes, Inc. v. United States, 524 F.2d 750 (C.C.P.A. !975), the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals found that Customs erroneously calculated the cost of production of imported merchandise by including the usual general expenses--Dr overhead--Df
selling in the country of exportation, rather than including (as it should have) the usual
general expenses incurred for products to be exported. Because the importer could not
prove the amount of usual general expenses for exports-which would have required the
importer to prove expenses incurred by other exporters-the erroneous Customs decision
was affirmed. Cases of this type are not uncommon. See, e.g., United States v. T.D. Downing

] 170

[Vol. 9: l 10 1

JUDICIAL REVIEW

difficult to require it as a. prerequisite for the successful challenge
of Customs decisions. For instance, a plaintiff required to prove
"usual general expenses" may not have access to the information
necessary to prove the expenses incurred by foreign exporters.
Similarly, proof of "United States value" would require proof of
the price at which such or similar merchandise (not just that of the
importer) is freely sold in the United States, plus proof of proper
allowances for "usual" commissions or profits, the "usual" cost of
transportation, and similar factors. Proving these dollar amounts
can be an exceedingly difficult task. 273 The unfairness of the rule is
increased by the fact that Customs itself need only "estimate" on
the basis of the best available evidence. 274 An additional consideration is that Customs often has readier access to the necessary
information than does the importer. 275
Because of the dual burden of proof, importers and U.S. competitors are inhibited from challenging Customs decisions, thus reducing the effectiveness of judicial review in assuring that Customs
decisions are correct and fair. Since there is no good reason for
requiring the party challenging Customs action to prove what the
correct action should be, the rule should be changed. If after trial
the Customs Court lacks the information necessary to determine
the correct action, it can remand the case to Customs. Customs
then can ascertain the necessary additional facts as it normally does
Co., 20 C.C.P.A. 251 (1932) (prior to 1955 amendments to valuation standards, importer
must prove foreign value and export value, or that one was nonexistent, in order to show
which is preferred). See also Brooks Paper Co. v. United States, 40 C.C.P.A. 38 (1952)
(plaintiff must establish usual wholesale quantities in which such or similar merchandise was
freely offered). Similarly, importers have demonstrated that the classification made by
Customs was erroneous, but have lost by faiting to demonstrate the correct classification.
United States v. Enrique C. Lineiro, 37 C.C.P.A. 5 (1949); New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. United States, 314 F. Supp. 1246 (Cust. Ct. ·1970).
273
The evidence needed to prove the value of merchandise is often in the exporter's Illes
and may be inaccessible to the importer.
274
See note 4 7 supra and accompanying text.
275
The dual burden of proof is not always difficult for the plaintiff to satisfy. When the
same evidence can be used both to show that the Customs action was wrong and to establish
the plaintiffs contentions, there is effectively a single burden of proof on the plaintiff. Thus,
where the imp·ons could be classified under one of two possible classifications, proof that
Custom's classification is in error may also demonstrate that the classification relied upon by
the importer is correct. See Associated Metals & Minerals Corp. v. United States, 426 F. Supp.
568 (Cust. Ct. 1977). Or, if the only issue is whether a buying commission is bonafide (in
which case it is not included in value), the same evidence used to rebut the presumption that
Customs correctly decided the issue also may establish that the buying commission was bona
fide.
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(by all "reasonable means"), making a new administrative determination, which again would be presumptively correct and subject to
a protest or petition.
The recommendation here would preserve the presumption of
correctness underlying action of the Customs Service, but would
give the Customs Court authority either to modify or reverse the
action, and to remand the proceeding to the Customs Service for a
new determination. It is expected that the court would use its
remand authority flexiblyi were the necessary facts readily available, the court might order the parties to produce them so that the
court could make a final determination without remand. Often the
parties themselves might introduce evidence facilitating a final decision, or the Service might avoid remand by making alternative
findings at the administrative _leveL
The proposed change specifies that the court may determine
what action is correct. This would enable the court to make
findings which were more detrimental to the plaintiff than the
original Customs decision. The court might, for example, find a
classification which bore a higher rate of duty than the classification
relied on by Customs or the plaintiff. Although some have argued
that this threat of an adverse Customs Court decision might chill
the interest of potential plaintiffs in judicial review, the rule contained in the recommendations seems appropriate since it attempts
to ensure that correct determinations will be made.
Finally, the recommendation provides that a remand order of
the Customs Court would be appealable to the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals. That court now has jurisdiction to review any
"final order" of the Customs Court, but it is not dear whether this
would by itself enable immediate review of remand orders; 276 the
proposal would make this explicit. Such review is necessary to
protect the right of the government to have decisions of the Customs Court re~iewed. Without it, if on remand the Customs Service
made a determination with which the plaintiff agreed, there could
076
Circuit courts have split on whether their authority to review a district court's "llnal
order," 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970), includes authority to review a district court order rem:lllding a case to an administrative agency for further consideration. Compare Gueory v.
Hampton, 510 F.2d 1222, 1224-25 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (remand order to Civil S-rvice Commission appealable as a "final order") and Cohen v. Perales, 412 F.2d 44, 48 (5th Cir. 1970), rev"d
on other grounds sub nom. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 ( 1971) with Pauls v. Secretary of
the Air Force, 457 F.2d 294, 297-98 (1st Cir. 1972) and United Transport Union v.lll. Cent.
Ry., 433 F.2d 566, 568-69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 915 ( 1970).
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be no appeal and no means of having the remand decision reviewed. Therefore, immediate review of the remand decision
should be permitted.
Review of Decisions to Exclude Merchandise

Merchandise entered through Customs control may be excluded
from the United States in a variety of ways and for a variety of
reasons. Customs may refuse to release the merchandise, seize the
merchandise, or demand redelivery of merchandise already released. The decision to take such exclusionary action ma,y be made
by Customs personnel or by personnel of another agency.
Exclusion cases raise a multiplicity of issues. The recommendations made here address two: availability of timely review by the
Customs Court, and exclusion under the trademark and copyright
statutes.
1. Expedited Review
Congress should amend the statutes giving preference to certain types of
cases in the Customs Court, 28 U.S.C. § 2633, and the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals, 28 U.S.C. § 2602, to ensure a similar preference for
cases properly before either court· involving exclusion of merchandise from
entry or delivery.
There is justification for Customs continuing the present practice
of holding merchandise pending an exclusion decision. Congress
has prohibited some goods from entering the United States because of a legislative determination that use or circulation of the
goods within the United States would be harmful; release of goods
pending an exclusion decision would jeopardize the interests Congress intended to protect. Moreover, because all merchandise must
go through import processing, it is convenient to have Customs
ensure that the merchandise meets regulatory standards. 277
277

Sometimes the practice of first holding or seizing merchandise and later deciding
whether it should be excluded results in inconsistent treatment between imported merchandise and domestic merchandise. For example, the owner of aU .S. trademark cannot enjoin a
domestic firm from infringing the trademark without first demonstrating to a court (at least
in a preliminary hearing) the validity of his trademark and the fact of infringement.
However, he can effectively enjoin allegedly infringing imports merely by convincing Customs of the infringement and having the merchandise detained and seized. Similarly, an
imported article allegedly infringing a copyright may be seized (even from the importer's
customer) prior to adjudication of the fact of infringement; a domestic article could not be.
See, e.g., Foreign &. Domestic Music Corp. v. Licht, 196 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1952) (imported
article infringing copyright can be seized even if in third party's hands, but infringing
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However, unless the procedures for securing administrative and
judicial review of a decision to exclude or seize merchandise are
timely, it is often extremely prejudicial to hold the goods pending a
decision. Imports may be perishable or seasonal merchandise, or
the importer may need the merchandise to fulfill production· or
marketing commitments. In such instances, even temporary exclusion may have a permanent and irreparable effect on the importer.
Moreover, issues surrounding exclusion should be dealt with
promptly to enable importers to make future purchasing and
shipping plans knowledgeably.
Administrative and judicial decision-making processes now used
in exclusion cases are sometimes inadequate. Exclusion of merchandise under a customs law can be protested immediately and
will be reviewed by Customs within 30 days after the protest is
filed. However, no procedures protect against irreparable injury
while decisions are being made and reconsidered or permit the
Customs Court to review the decisions expeditiously. As one prominent customs attorney has said: "There is no way to get speedy
judicial review when speed is essential if the review is to be effective."278
This proposal, coupled with the previous recommendations to
authorize the Customs Court to. exercise the remedial power of
district courts, should enable the Customs Court to provide a forum
within which disputed issues in exclusion cases under its jurisdiction can be speedily resolved.

2. Customs Service Authority Under the Trademark and Copyright Statutes
Congress should amend the statutes under which the Customs Service is
authorized to detain and seize merchandise that allegedly infringes a trademark, 19 U.S.C. § 1526, or copyright, 17 U.S.C. § 603, to provide that
the Customs Service may take no such action until the owner of the
trademark or copyright obtains an order in the district court enjoining the
importation. Alternatively, Congress should amend the trademark statute, as
it has the copyright statute, to authorize the Customs Service to establish by
regulation such a condition precedent to its acting to detain and seize
articles which are domestic cannot be so seized). This consideration influenced the recommendation below that C!fstoms be divested of authority to exclude merchandise for trademark and copyright infringement.
278
Address by George Bronz, Second Judicial Conference of the U.S. Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals (May 29, 1975), reprinted in 69 F.R.D. 119, 182 (1976).
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allegedly infringing merchandise, and the Customs Service should promulgate such a regulation. In any event, the Customs Service should adopt
express procedures that would enable the owner of a trademark or copyright
to identify imported merchandise that may infringe his mark or copyright.

There are several reasons for this recommendation. First, as
already noted, the detention and seizure of such merchandise by
Customs places· imported merchandise in a different position from
domestically produced merchandise. No government agency enforces trademark or copyright laws against domestic merchandise;
domestic merchandise is not detained or seized because a government employee believes it infringes a U.S. trademark or copyright.
The owner of a trademark or copyright who wishes to enjoin
commerce in allegedly infringing domestic merchandise must first
prove the infringement and the validity of his trademark or copyright in court.
_
The different treatment of imported merchandise is harmful
and unjustified. Importers risk substantial delays because of decisions made by an import specialist. In effect, the importer can be
enjoined from dealing in his merchandise even before there is an
adjudicated decision concerning the infringement claim. Moreover, owners of U.S. trademarks have ample incentive and ability
to protect their own interests. Unlawful importation can be enjoined; and importers can be sued for damages resulting from past
unlawful importations. 279
Congress has recognized that under the copyright act "[t]he
Customs Service is often in no position to make determinations as
to whether particular articles are piratical." 280 As a result, Congress
has given the Treasury Department authority to require by regulation that the person seeking exclusion either obtain a court order
enjoining importation or furnish proof of his claim and post a
bond to cover damages resulting from Customs' unjustified detention or exclusion of merchandise. 281 Similar considerations inc
fluence the recommendation concerning the action Customs takes
279
There is some risk that foreign exporters desiring to sell infringing merchandise in the
United States (and not themselves subject to suit in the United States) could avoid liability by
dealing through importers who would be judgment proof. This appears to be an unlikely
occurrence, and an acceptable risk that can be minimized through effective enforcement of
judgments.
280
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 171, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CoDE CoNG. &
AD. NEWS 5659, 5787.
281
General Revision of Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101,90 Stat. 2541 (1976)
(to be codified at 17 U .S.C. § 603).
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under the trademark act. The expertise of the Customs Service is
not geared toward deciding the sensitive issues surrounding possible consumer confusion in trademark disputes, and Customs'
decision-making in such disputes cannot encompass all of the substantive questions that need to be examined. For example, when
deciding whether imports infringe a registered trademark, Customs has no authority to consider the validity of the trademark
registration. As a result, in at least one case Customs has seized and
destroyed merchandise for allegedly infringing a trademark even
though the trademark did not qualify for registration and was
therefore not entitled to protection. 282
Imposition of Civil Penalties

The means by which the· Customs Service assesses and collects
civil penalties, particularly under section 592 of the Tariff Act of
1930, have been under auack for a number of years. 283 Knowledgeable observers have correctly noted the "unfairness and obsolescence"284 of this "antiquated" 285 provision that leads to "arbitrary and irresponsible behavior ." 286
David R. Macdonald, then Assistant Secretary of the Treasury,
referred to "the Section 592 magnum," combining the qualities of a
"Gatling gun and a 10-pound smooth bore cannon." The only
problem with using section 592, he said, "is that sometimes it's
difficult to identify the victim afterwards." 287 It is easy to see 1Nhy.
The statutory penalty for section 592 violations is usually disproportionate to the nature of the conduct and degree of culpability
involved and to the revenue deficiency or other injury resulting
from the violation. The mitigation procedure is intended to
ameliorate the harsh effects of the statutory penalty, but instead it
'"" See Platilite Corp. v. Kassnar Imports, 508 F.2d 824 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (following seizure
and destrucrion of merchandise bearing allegedly infringing mark, the trademark alleged to
have been infringed was found to be invalid).
283
For a discussion of enforcement of section 592, see teJ~t accompanying notes 111-34
supra.
28
·' Dickey II, supra note 112, at 694.
285
_Modernization Act Hearings, supra note 9, at 188 (statement of Robert E. Herzstein).
286
American Importers Ass'n, Why Customs' Penalty Statute (Sec. 592) Must be
Changed! (unpublished position paper on file with the Administrative Conference of the
United States).
287
Address by David R. Macdonald, Ass't Secretary of the Treasury, before the American
Importers Ass'n (Sept. 10, 1974), reprinted in U.S. Dep't of Treasury News Release (Sept. 10,
!974).

1176

[Vol. 9: l1 01

JUDICIAL REVIEW

shields the administrative action of penalty assessment from judicial review. 288 Persons against whom a penalty is assessed by Customs virtually always accept a mitigated penalty and thus forego
judicial review. As a result, Customs is not held accountable
through the judicial review process for what it does.
There are many proposals for the reform of section 592. 289 The
recommendations below articulate a number of principles for its
reform. 290
1. Penalties
Section 592 should be amended to provide for civil money penalties
against the person violating the statute rather than for forfeiture of the
merchandise or the full value thereof. Congress should establish maximum
penalties based upon the revenue deficiency, if any, resulting from the
violation, and upon the degree of culpability of the violator. In any case in
which the violation does not result in a revenue deficiency, the maximum
penalties should be based upon a portion of the value of the imported
merchandise and upon the degree of culpability of the violator.. If the
violator is an· importer, he should be given the option of surrendering his
merchandise in lieu of payment of any penalty assessed.
The first principle of these recommendations is that section 592
should be revised so that forfeiture of merchandise, or its full value,
is no longer the penalty for section 592 violations. Establishing
penalties based upon the value of merchandise means that penalties often bear no relation to the conduct constituting the violation
or to the culpability of the violator. This leads to unequal treatment: for example, two persons who separately misstate the invoice
price of imports would be subject to differing penalties solely
because the value of their merchandise is different. It also leads to
denial of judicial review: the assessed penalty often is so disproportionate to the violation that companies may feel compelled to
accept mitigation offered by the Customs Service rather than take
288

See generally Dickey I, supra note 112; Dickey II, supra note 112; Herzstein, supra note

112.
289
See, e.g., Dickey 11, supra note 112, at 729. In addition, the Chamber of Commerce of
the United States, the American Importers Association, and many other persons and organizations have proposed reforms. The recommendations made here are similar to provisions
of legislation now before the House of Representatives.
290 The recommendations do not address several issues raised by other proposals to
reform section 592, e.g., the definition of conduct that violates section 592; the applicable
statute of limitations (see 19 U .S.C. § 1621 (1970)); and reduced penalties for the voluntary
disclosure of violations. See 19 C.F.R. § 171.1 ( 1977).
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the risk of seeking judicial review. Therefore, forfeiture should be
dropped as a sanction fo:r section 592 violations.
h is also recommended that the penalty in section 592 be stated as
a maximum amount rather than a fixed amount, and that the coun
reviewing the penalty assessment should have the authority to
determine independently the amount of penalty to be imposed.
Penalties in fixed amounts for prohibited conduct have some advantages over maximum penalties; they are predictable and uniform and avoid problems of disoaritv in the sanctions annlied in
different cases. 29 i For these reasO'ns the Administrative cddference
of the United States rejected, in its study of penalties imposed by
the Internal Revenue Service, the idea that IRS penalty statutes
should contain maximum penalties and recommended instead that
penalties be in a fixed amount. 292 However, there is no standard
model to follow; penalties are . sometimes fixed by statute and
sometimes determined by the decision-maker within maximum
penalties established by statute. 293
In the context of section 592, penalties in fixed amounts would
be unwise because often they would be disproportionate to the
violation. Conduct challenged under section 592 varies widely. Violations of section 592 include misstatements of: the invoice price of
the merchandise; its quantity or weight; and its country of origin.
Each may result from different motivations, require different degrees of volition or subject the violator to different risks of detection. In addition, the culpability of the violator is often a matter of
degree. Even negligent conduct-the failure to adopt procedures
reasonably designed to ensure that mistakes do not occur-is not a
single concept, but can embody various degrees of culpability depending upon the circumstances.
Many mitigating and aggravating circumstances should be taken
291
See Gellhorn, Administrative Prescription and Imposition of Penalties, 1970 WASH. U .LQ.
265, 276; Goldschmid, Report in Support of Recommendation 72-6: An Evaluation of the Present
and Potential Use of Civil Money Penalties as a Sanction by Federal Administrative Agencies, 2
RecOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTs OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CoNFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 896, 942 (1972).
292
ADMINISTRATIVE CoNFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, A. D1\HNISTPJ-~TrvE PRocEDUP....Es OF
THE INTERNAL REveNue ScRVrcc, S. Doc No. 266, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 646-49 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as IRS REPORT].
293
Compare I.R.C. § 6653 (penalties in fixed amounts for civil fraud, negligence, and
intentional disregard of rules or regulations) with Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act
of 1969. 30 U .S.C. § 8l9(a)(l) ( 1970) (maximum penalties). Over half the penalties administered by federal agencies provide for variable or maximum penalties. Goldschmid. supra
note 291, at 957-64.
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into account so that penalties reflect the seriousness of the violation. The Customs Service lists the following seven factors it considers when ruling on petitions for mitigation: the fact that loss of
revenue from the violation is small in relation ~o the forfeiture
value; contributory error by a Customs employee; cooperation of
the offender in the investigation; inexperience in importing; remedial action taken after the violation was discovered, including
rectification of any revenue deficiency resulting from the violation;
prior good record; and inability to pay. 294 It also lists several
aggravating factors: conduct impeding the investigation; previous
record of a violation; or experience in importing. 295 Regardless of
the relevance of, or the weight to be given to, these particular
factors, it is clear that many variables determine the seriousness of
any section 592 violation.
As a result of the many variables in section 592 cases, it would be
virtually impossible to establish fixed statutory penalties to reflect
all of the different elements that should be taken into account in
determining an appropriate sanction. Therefore, the fixed penalties, unless mitigated by administrative discretion, would be inequitably high in some cases; in other cases they would be ineffective as a deterrent.
Moreover, with penalties in fixed amounts the Customs Service
would continue to be able to shield its administrative determinations from judicial review by making a mitigation offer the alleged
violator would accept in order to avoid the fixed penalty which
would be imposed if the finding of a violation were upheld by a
reviewing court. This power of "administrative blackmail" makes
the present enforcement of section 592 unfair and should not be
continued.
For these reasons, Congress should enact a maximum penalty,
and should authorize the court reviewing section 592 assessments
to make an independent determination of the amount of the penalty to be imposed. Maximum penalties for section 592 violations
will be most realistic and effective if they are based upon some
multiple of the loss of revenue to the government ensuing fmm the
29
' 39 Fed. Reg. 39,061 (1974). Customs also lists as a "mitigating" factor the "probable
difficulty in collecting because offender is outside the jurisdiction of the United States."
Although practicality may induce Customs to mitigate penalty assessments in order to collect
something on assessments that would otherwise be uncollectible, this does not seem to be a
"mitigating" factor as that term is generally used.
295
/d. at 39,062.
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violation. This is true because such loss measures both the injury to
the government from the violation and the benefit of the prohibited
conduct in question to the violator. Such penalties deter violations
and compensate the government for losses and risks of undetected
violations. Determining the multiple of the loss of revenue that
should be established as a penalty will require careful examination
of the difficulty of detecting violations and the deterrent effect of
various penalty amounts. Congress could consider the multiples of
revenue deficiency now used by Customs in mitigating penalty
assessments as a starting point for its analysis of these questions.
It is recommended that the penalties under section 592 be established for three degrees of culpability. 296 This is necessary because
often conduct may be intentional (i.e., with knmvledge that underpayment of duties will result) or reckless (i.e.; with disregard of a
substantial risk that underpayment will result) without being severe
enough to warrant a heavy penalty for fraudulent conduct. 297 In
such cases, a middle category of defined culpability will help to
ensure that the sanction fits the violation.
A small percentage of section 592 proceedings involve violations
which harm the interests Customs is charged with protecting, but
do not cause a loss of revenue. This occurs, for example, when a
false or fraudulent practice enables an importer to avoid a quota
restriction, but the importer pays the proper duty on the merchandise. In such cases it is difficult to establish a statutory penalty
that compensates the government for ir~ury to its interests and also
deters violations. In order to promote certainty and flexibility in
setting the penalty, the recommendation would provide that when
there is no loss of revenue to the government the maximum pen-

206
This proposal is derived from the recommendations of the Administrative Conference
of the United States concerning penalties imposed for understatement of federal income
taxes. See Recommendation 75-7 of the Administrative Conference of the United States, 41
Fed. Reg. 3981, 3984-85 (1976), I C.F.R. § 305.75-.77 (1977). There, three degrees of
culpability-negligence, reckless or intentional conduct, and fraud-were found to be necessary. With only two standards of culpability (one for negligent conduct and one for fraudulent conduct) "a surprisingly broad range of conduct is covered by the negligence penalty.
Intentional misstatements are often penalized with the same degree of harshness as mere
negligence. Such whimsical and unequal results are probably quite different from what
Congress intended." REPORT ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES Of THE ]NTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 281, at 641.
'" 7 The Customs Service already employs three standards of culpability in deciding
whether to mitigate assessed penalties: negligence, gross negligence, and fraud. 39 Fed. Reg.
39,061 (1974).
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alty would equal some portion of the value of the imported·
merchandise. This would reduce the coercive impact of the present
forfeiture penalty while maintaning a high penalty as a deterrent. ·
The recommendation also provides the alleged violator of section 592 with the option of surrendering the imported merchandise in lieu of paying the statutory penalty. This will occur rarely,
because in most circumstances the value of the merchandise to the
alleged violator will be very much greater than the potential monetary penalty. This option is necessary, however, because of peculiarities in the appraisement of merchandise. An imported manuscript for a book, for example, may be appraised at a ·value which
includes the value of,. the research undertaken to write the book. In
such cases the appraised value of the merchandise, and thus the
potential loss of revenue, is greatly disproportionate to the value of
the merchandise to the importer. Accordingly, the option allowing
the violator to surrender the merchandise will ensure that penalties
based upo'n loss of revenue are not themselves disproportionate to
the violation.
2.

Administrative Procedures and Judicial Review

The Customs Service should have the authority to assess and to mitigate
civil penalties. If an assessment is contested, action by the government to
enforce a penalty should be in the Customs Court. In such an action, the
government should have the burden of proving the act or omission constituting a violation and, if so alleged, the intentional nature thereof The
Customs Court should be authorized to determine de novo the amount of
the penalty.
It is recommended that the Customs Service maintain the penalty
assessment and mitigation procedures it uses now. If an assessment
is contested, the Service should be required to bring an enforcement action in a court. Customs' informal administrative procedures enable it to dispose of large numbers of cases without unnecessary procedural burdens. At the saine time, procedural fairness
should be guaranteed to alleged violators through full judicial
review. The Administrative Conference of the United States has
recommended that civil money penalties be assessed in most cases
through adjudicatory procedures at the agency leveJ.2 98 The proposal here, while it deviates in form from that recommendation, is
298

See Recommendation 72-0: Civil Money Penalties as a Sanction, 2

REPORTS AND REcoM-

MENDATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
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consistent with the basis of the recommendation-that assessing
and collecting penalties would be facilitated if the agency were not
required to initiate assessment actions· in a federal district court.
Since the Customs Court is a specialized court with expertise in the
underlying substantive issues, many of the factors normally supporting adjudication at the administrative· level support adjudication of Customs penalty cases in the Customs Court. 299
A significant issue raised by proposals to reform section 592 is
whether governmentenforcement actions 300 under section 592 will
be brought in a district court, in the Cl_!stoms Court, or both. Most
other proposals for the reform of section 592 contemplate that
such actions will continue in the district court, 301 although another
possibility would involve concurrent jurisdiction in the Customs
Court and district courts. Under the latter option, cases could be
brought in the district co{zrt, but the defendant would have the
option of transferring the case to the Customs Court under procedures patterned after those used in removing a suit from state to
a federal court. 302 The r~commendation of this article would place
exclusive jurisdiction over penalty cases in the Customs Court.
Three factors support this arrangement, although there are
countervailing considerations. First, the Customs Court has more
experience than district courts with the issues that often arise in
section 592 proceedings. Although questions of fact can be decided
with equal ease by the Customs Court and district courts, the
resolution of section 592 issues often requires interpretation and
application of the customs law, a function that in nonpenalty cases
is generally performed exclusively by the Customs Court. 303 Such

a

299
Thus, crowding of district court dockets is not a factor favoring administrative adjudication in this instance. The need for specialized knowledge and expertise, the degree to
which issues of law are likely to arise, the importance of consistency of outcome, and the
likelihood that an agency will establish an impartial forum-factors mentioned by Professor
Goldschmid in his report, supra note 291 at 932-33-all support adjudication in the Customs
Court.
·
300
The term "government enforcement actions" is used because this Article does not
consider whether the Customs Service should be authorized to directly enforce section 592
in court without relying, as it now does, upon Department of Justice enforcement actions.
301
This is true of both H.R. 8149 and H.R. 8367, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), as well as
the proposals advanced by the American Bar Association, the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States, and the American Importers Association. Most of these private groups,
however, appear not to have focused on which forum is most appropriate for the review of
section 5 92 cases.
302
The procedures for removing a case from a state to a federal court are in 28 U .S.C. §
1446 (1970).
303
The Customs Court is best able to decide, for example, whether blueprints given by an
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issues frequently arise in section 592 proceedings, and adjudication
in the Customs Court should facilitate and ensure consistency in
the resolution of these
issues.
,.
A second factor favoring enforcement of section 592 in the
Customs Court is the likelihood that it will impose more uniform
penalties. With enforcement in 9-istrict courts, cases would be
brought before judges throughout the country, each judge would
hear few cases, and judges would not be familiar with decisions
made by other judges. By contrast, centralizing the decisionmaking in one court with a small number of judges would facilitate
(although not necessarily ensure) the development of a consistent
judicial consensus concerning penalties to be imposed.
The third factor favoring Customs Court enforcement of section
592 is that the Customs Court can assure speedier adjudication
because its docket is less crowded than the dockets of the district
courts. Indeed, the underutilization of the resources of the Customs Court suggests that it could assume at least some new responsibilities without need for additional resources. 304 Thus, enforcement of section 592 in the Customs Court would promote a better
allocation of judicial resources.
Two potential drawbacks to enforcing section 592 in the Customs
Court can be overcome. The first is that the Customs Court sits
primarily in New York City while district courts may be more
accessible to persons at ports in other cities. However, the Customs
Court is authorized to hold trials at any place within its jurisdiction
and does sit at trials in many places. 305 The judges of the Customs
Court can "ride circuit," ensuring that those subject to section 592
proceedings are not unduly prejudiced by the location of a trial.
Although this would involve some delay in scheduling trials, the
delay is likely to be shorter than the delay attendant upon litigation
in a district court.
The second potential drawback is that in the Customs Court
issues of fact are decided by a judge, not a jury. Some defendants
in section 592 cases may feel the loss of a right to a jury trial to be
significant.. It seems clear that the constitutional guarantee of a
importer to a foreign supplier should have been declared as a dutiable "assist" and whether
the failure to make such declaration violates section 592. Similarly, questions concerning the
declaration of "selling commissions" and interpretations of other intricate customs laws and
regulations raise issues which by experience the Customs Court is best suited to handle.
304
See notes 208-09 supra and accompanying text.
305
28 U .S.C. § 256 (1970).
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right to a jury trial does not extend to enforcement proceedings
brought by the government to assess or collect civil penalties. Recently, in Atlas Rorifing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Comm'n, 306 the Supreme Court held that:
in cases in which 'public rights' are being litigated-e.g.,
cases in which the Government sues in its sovereign
capacity to enforce public rights created by statutes within
the power of Congress to enact-the Seventh Amendment
does not prohibit Congress from assigning the fact-finding
function and initial adjudication to an administrative
forum with which the jury would be incompatible. 307
Because section 592 suits are brought by the government in its
sovereign capacity to enforce a "public right," Congress could assign the fact-finding function in section 592 proceedings to an
administrative tribunal, and a fortiori to a federal judge without a
Jury.
A more difficult question is whether Congress should make jury
trials available in section 592 proceedings even though the Constitution does not :require it to do so. It is not necessary to decide
that question, however, to determine that the Customs Court is the
preferred forum. In view of the advantages the Customs Court
offers for section 592 enforcement, should it see fit to do so,
Congress could authorize the Customs Court to empanel juries for
that purpose.
Under present law, when the government sues to recover a
penalty under section 592 (or any of the other penalty provisions
enforced by Customs) it need only show probable cause for the
institution of the suit. Hit does so the penalty is imposed unless the
:respondent proves that the statute was not violated .308 In view of
the informal administrative process used by Customs to determine
whether section 592 has been violated ,309 this :rule is unsatisfactory.
It shields the administrative determination from :review by requiring alleged violators to assume the difficult burden of demonstrating that an alleged act did not occur.
306

97 S. Ct. I26I (I 977).
I d. at I 266. This conclusion was reached by some scholars even before the Atlas Roofing
decision. See, e.g., Goldschmid, supra note 29I, at 943.
308
I 9 U.S.C. § I 6I5 (I 970). See, e.g., United States v. One J 97I Chevrolet Corvette Auto,
307

496 F.2d 2J 0 (5th Cir. I 974); United States v. Fields, 425 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1970).
309
See notes I2I-32 supra and accompanying text.
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The proper allocation of the risk that the trier of fact, faced with
conflicting reasonable inferences, will doubt the inference asserted
by a party, depends on considerations of fairness, convenience, and
policy. 310 The party seeking to change the present state of affairs
or impose a sanction normally bears the risk of non persuasion. 311
This is generally desirable because. it reduces the chance. that the
status quo will be changed or the sanction imposed erroneously.
The risk may also be imposed on the party who contends that the
more uhusual event has occurred, 312 and is often allocated to avoid
requiring a party to prove a negative-so that a party need not
prove that an act did not occur.
Based upon these factors, it is recommended that in proceedings
to enforce section 592 the government have the burden of proving
the acts constituting, the violation and, if it seeks penalties for
intentional (i.e., non-negligent) conduct, that the acts were done
intentionally. 313 This should be required because in section 592
cases the government seeks to impose a heavy penalty. As long as
the penalty assessment is based upon informal procedures the
government should bear the burden of proof so that the facts
underlying the assessment are subjected to full and impartial
scrutiny. The burden of proving that conduct was intentional is not
unduly severe, since such conduct generally requires an overt act
(e.g., double invoicing) which is capable of discovery and proof.
On the other hand, if the government seeks penalties for allegedly negligent conduct, this recommendation would not require
the government to demonstrate that the plaintiff failed to exercise
due care. It need only prove that the false statement or practice
occurred; the defendant would then have the burden of proving
that he exercised due care (i.e., that he employed practices reasonably designed to avoid acts of the type alleged to constitute the
violation). 314 Shifting the burden of proof in this way relieves the
310 IX j. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2486, at 275 (3d ed. 1940); E. MoRGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS
OF EviDENCE 28 ( 1962).
311 C. 'McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE 786 (2d ed. 1972}; Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay
on juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5, 7 (1959).
312
C. McCoRMICK, supra note 311, at 787.
313 Thus, the presumption of correctness of Customs action, 28 U.S.C. § 2635(a) (1970),
would not be applicable in section 592 cases.
314 The recommendation contemplates that proof of false statements or. practices will
create a rebuttable presumption that the act or practice resulted from negligence. Even if
this were not explicitly stated, it is likely to happen as a practical matter in the trial of
negligence cases.
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government from proving a negative (Lhe absence of due care) and
decreases the risks that false statements win go unsanctioned because of uncertainty over the required standard of care.
This recommendation is inconsistent in one respect with a similar
recommendation the Administrative Conference of the United
States made concerning the enforcement of penalties by the KRS.
Under that recommendation the alleged violator would have the
burden of persuasion if the government sought penalties for an
intentional or reckless violation, 315 primarily because "the facts
concerning his state of mind are in his possessio11.'' 316 The premise
supporting that approach is undoubtedly accurate, but the recommendation does not necessarily follow from the premise. Although
a person knows whar he intended, he should not necessarily have
the burden of persuasion on that issue 317 since that would require
him to prove a negative-that" he did not know the consequences of
his conduct. 318 In view of the high penalties which are likely to be
adopted for intentional violations of section 592 319 the alleged
violator should not have that burden.
3. Publishing Standards
ln order to ensure that those subject to possible penalties under section
592 know what is expected of them under the laws administered and
enforced by the Customs Service, the Service should, to the maximum extent
feasible, adopt and publish standards that will guide its determinations
under those laws.
This recommendation is proposed because a significant number
of penalty assessments are attributable to misinterpretation of Customs requirements by the alleged violator, or failure to understand
one of his duties as an importer. For example, an importer must
furnish on the entry documents all information necessary to establish the value of goods. He may, however, fail to declare (as is
required) the value of blueprints or drawings or other assists given
to the foreign supplier, and thus submit a "false" statement to the
~

-

315

Recommendations 75-77 of the Administrative Conference of the United States, 41
Fed. Reg. 3981, 3984 (1976); I C.F.R. § 305.75-77 (1977).
316
IRS REPORT, supra ·note 292, at 549-50.
317
See j. WIGMORE, supra note 310, at 275; E. MoRGAN, supra note 310, at 28.
31
° For example, under section 592 an importer charged with failing to declare an assist
would have the burden of proving that he did not know that the assist should be declared.
319
See, e.g., H.R. 8149, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., § I 12(a) (1977), which sets the penalty for
violations resulting from gross negligence at four times the loss of revenue resulting from
the violation or the domestic value of the merchandise, whichever is less.
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Customs Service. Yet there are no regulations defining an assist or
even stating that it must be declared. The alleged violator therefore
may be penalized unfairly for violating a rule that was difficult for
him to interpret or know of at all. To alleviate such problems, the
Customs Service should adopt and publish standards that will
guide its determination of what conduct constitutes a violation.

4. Seizure
The authority of the Customs Service to seize and hold merchandise under
section 592 (other than prohibited or restricted merchandise) should be
·limited to instances where it is necessary to protect Customs' ability to collect
any revenue deficiency or penalty, and the Service should be required to
release the merchandise to the owner upon his provision of security for
payment of that revenue or penalty. Where no such release is effected by the
owner, the Customs Service should be required to release the merchandise not
later than 60 days after seizure, unless the government has initiated an
action in the Customs Court within that period and obtained an extension
for good cause from the court. In instances where the Customs Court permits
the Service to hold merchandise for sale by the Service to satisfy any revenue
deficiency or penalty determined by the court, the net proceeds of such sale,
after allowance for the judgment and costs of the sale, should be paid to the
owner.
Seizure of merchandise is a drastic, coercive sanction, with effects
usually disproportionate to the section 592 violation. The authorization for seizure in section 592 reflects the antiquated conception
of section 592 as in rem remedy, which is no longer appropriate.
Because virtually all importers (and others potentially subject to
section 592) are solvent, and most do business regularly in the
United States, seizure is generally unnecessary to ensure collection
of penalty assessments.
The Customs Service recently amended the Customs regulations
to reflect evolving practice, providing that merchandise shall only
be seized for violations of section 592 if the district director is
satisfied that the violator appears to be, or may soon become,
insolvent; the violator or his assets appear to be beyond the jurisdiction of the United States; or for some other reason a claim for
the domestic value of the merchandise would not protect the revenue.320 This is sound practice and should be adopted in legisla320
42 Fed. Reg. 25,323 (1977) corrected by 42 Fed. Reg. 27,599 (1977) (to be codified in 19
C.F.R. § !62.4I(a)(3)).
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tion. 321 The :recommendations of this anicle would do so by autho:rizing the Customs SeTVice to seize merchandise under section
592 only when the merchandise is itself prohibited from entering
the country, or when seizure is necessary to protect the ability of
Customs to collect any revenue defiCiency o:r penalty. The recommendation would also require the Customs Service to release non:. prohibited merchandise upon the provision of security for the payment of such revenue or deficiency. Forfeiture would not be a
sanction; it would be used only when necessary to satisfy the judgment of the court. The net proceeds of the forfeiture sale, after
allowance for the judgment and costs of sale, would be paid to the
owner.
The recommendation also includes procedures to ensure that
any seizure by the Customs Service under section 592-a drastic
sanction based on an info:r~al administrative determination-is
subject to prompt and impartial judicial review. H the owner has
not obtained the :release of merchandise which has been seized, the
Customs Service would be required to release the merchandise not
later than 60 days after seizure unless the government initiated a
collection action and obtained an extension for good cause from
the court.
5. Other Statutes
Each of the other penalty provisions enforced by the Customs Service
should be reviewed and Tevised where appropriate in a manner consistent
with the fm·egoing recormnendaiions.

Section 592 is only one of 40 provisions that authorize the Customs Service to impose civil penalties or fines, some of which have
the same undesirable characteristics as section 592. 322 Penalties are
often enormously high in relation i:o the nature of the violation or
the culpability of the violator. The mitigation procedures that impede judicial review of section 592 penalty cases are used in the
enforcement of the other penahy provisions as \vell. 323 Accordm H.R. 8149, 95th Con g., 1st Sess. § 112(a) (I Y77), contains a similar provision. H.R.
8367, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), the proposal drafted by the Department of Treasury,
does not.
300
See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1586 (1970) (Customs may seize vessels unloading merchandise
without a permit); id. § 1585 (Customs may seize vessel if its master fails to report the entry of
the vessel); id. § 1584 (Customs may seize merchandise not included on a vessel's manifest).
Although such sanctions may be appropriate when smuggling is involved, they do not seem
appropriate if the conduct results from negligence.
323
See Procedural Reform Hearings, supra note 14, at 241 (statement of Philip Steinberg),
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ingly; the other penalty provisions should be reviewed to assess
how they can be changed to better serve both the trading community and the other interests Customs is mandated to protect.
249 (statement of Wiley R. George), and 450 (statement of Independent Freight Forwarders
and Customs Brokers Ass'n).
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